논평
무대 ‘뒤편’에도 조명을 - 한길수 교수의 “Hereditary Succession in South Korean Churches”에 대하여
한때 올빼미 2025. 10. 19
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어제(2025.10.18) 한국언론학회가 열렸는데, 흥미로운 연구들이 여럿 있었지만 써야할 글에 정신을 차릴 수 없는 사정이라, 토론자로 초대된 '종교와 커뮤니케이션 연구회' 세션만 참가했다. 한길수(Gil-Soo Han. Monash University) 교수의 “Communicative Power and Inherited Pulpits: Media Narratives of Hereditary Succession in South Korean Churches”의 발표가 있었고, 나는 두 명이 토론자 중 하나였다.
한길수 교수의 논문은 그가 저술하고 있는 책의 일부인데, 아직 출판되지 않았고, 논문을 저술한 시기는 작년이었다. 꼼꼼한 리서치가 돋보였지만, 외국에서 연구한 것인데다, 한국어에도 충분히 익숙한 연구자가 아닌 탓에 어려움이 많았던 듯하다. 충실한 연구에 비해서 종합적으로 읽어내는 안목은 잘 보이지 않았다. 토론 시간에 말했듯이 한국과 멀리 떨어져 고립된 환경에서 연구한 것의 어려움 탓인듯하다. 그가 사용한 이론도 좀 낡은 느낌을 지울 수 없었다. 아무튼 그의 논문은 여기서 공개할 수 없고, 급하게 쓴 나의 토론문만을 공개한다.
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어제 내가 논평한 글의 저자인 한길수 교수로부터 정중한 편지를 받았다. 그의 편지를 보고 위의 내 코멘트를 보니, 과한 표현이 많았다는 것을 깨달았다. 어떤 생각으로 이렇게 표현했는지 생각나지 않지만, 분명한 것은 나의 문구로 한길수 교수를 모욕한 셈이 되었다는 사실이다. 한 교수께 정중히 사과드린다. '종합적으로 읽어내는 안목이 잘 보이지 않았다'는 표현이나 사용한 이론이 낡은 느낌'이라는 것은 표현이 과했다.
'종합적으로 읽어내지 않았다'는 말은
- 교회 세습에 현미경을 들리대기보다는 권력 세습의 관점에서 보는 것이 필요하다는 생각,
- 또 권력 세습 현상은 세계화 소용돌이에 휘말린 한국은 이미 파워엘리트 사회로 진입해 버렸고,
- 그 안에서 메리토크라시에 집착하는 한국사회 엘리트 집단의 무한경쟁체계가 교회에서 작동하는 방식을 주목하는 것이 더 중요하다는 생각,
- 자칫 교회세습 담론이 권력세습 현상을 주목하지 못하게 하는 장치로 작동할 수도 있다는 생각을 말하려던 것인데,
그렇다고 교회 세습에 대한 꼼곰한 연구 자체를 비아냉대는 식으로 말한 것은 정말 잘못된 태도다.
그리고 한 교수님이 리처드 니버를 참고했다는 걸 문제시한 것 또한 부적절한 말이었다. 그의 이론 활용이 어떤 점에서 문제인지를 말하지 않고 '낡은 이론' 운운하는 것은 너무나 섣부를 말이었습니다. 역시 한 교수께 정중히 사과드린다.
아래에 한 교수님의 정중한 문제제기를 담은 편지를 첨부한다.
언급하신 내용과 달리, 발표 당일 말씀드렸듯이, 본 논문은 ‘The Church that Laid the Golden Eggs’: Catalysts for Hereditary Succession in South Korea’s Protestant Church라는 제목으로 지난 7월 Asian Studies Review에 출판되었습니다. 이 학술지는 해당 분야에서 상위 25%에 드는 Q1급 학술지로, 엄격한 이중 맹검 심사(double-blind peer review) 절차를 거쳐 출판되었음을 알려드립니다. 출판되었다고 해서 완성된 글은 아니기에 논평해 주신 내용은 감사히 받았습니다. 다만, 독자들이 논문을 직접 읽거나 발표를 듣지 못한 상태에서 선생님의 논평만을 접하게 되면 자칫 오해의 소지가 생기거나 균형 잡힌 이해를 방해할 수 있습니다. 따라서 논문이 이미 출판되었기에 블로그에 논평과 함께 올려 주시는 것이 독자들의 폭넓은 이해를 돕는 데 더욱 좋았을 것이라는 아쉬움이 남습니다.
논문의 저자로서, 선생님께서 제기해주신 일부 지적 사항 및 논평의 내용에 대해 몇 가지 아쉬운 점과 저의 견해를 정리하여 선생님들, 그리고 독자들과 공유하고자 합니다.
논평 관련 저자의 견해
1. 발표 당일에는 청중들과의 대화가 기다리고 있었고, 논평에 대한 반론을 상세히 제기할 수 있는 시간적 여유가 충분하지 않았습니다. 이에 초대받은 손님으로서 저의 부족한 부분을 겸허히 수용하는 방식으로 답변을 대신했음을 밝힙니다. 이것이 발표 당일날 저자와의 깊은 대화에 초대해 주셨지만 그렇게 할 수 없었던 현실적인 배경이었습니다.
2. 연구의 질 평가 기준에 대하여: 해외 거주 학자가 한국 사회를 연구했다는 사실이 연구의 질과 관계있는 것으로 이해되거나 평가되어서는 안 된다고 생각합니다. 아울러, 저는 한국에서 고등교육을 받았으며 한국어로 출판된 관련 논문들을 충분히 이해하고 소통할 수 있고, 한국어 논문 출판 및 월간지, 한국어/영어 방송 등을 통하여 대중들과도 소통할 수 있는 학자임을 분명히 말씀드립니다.
3. 연구 환경 및 학문적 교류: 제가 비교적 한국에 있는 학자들과 긴밀하게 교류하고 있음에도, 지리적 환경 때문에 고립되어 연구하는 측면이 있는 것은 사실입니다. 하지만 저는 다양한 연구 서적 및 학문적 성과물들과 깊이 대화하며 연구를 진행하고 있습니다. 또한, 기회 있는 대로 한국학 등 국제 학회에서 연구를 발표하며 적극적으로 피드백을 수렴하여 논문에 반영하고 있음을 알려드립니다.
4. 이론의 선택과 고전의 가치에 관련하여: 선생님께서 제가 사용한 이론이 '낡은' 느낌을 준다고 언급하셨으나, 저는 최신 이론만이 사회현상을 훌륭하게 설명할 수 있다고 보지 않습니다. 저에게는 고전적 이론이 지닌 가치와 현재 사회현상을 깊이 있게 설명하는 능력 또한 매우 중요하며, 이를 쉽게 버리지 않는 것이 저의 연구 철학입니다. Richard Niebuhr (1951)의 “Christ and Culture”는 이제 고전으로서의 가치가 있으며 제 논문의 얼굴과 같은 역할을 하였습니다. 하지만 더 중요한 연구 이론의 근간으로 사용된 것은 “비판적 사실주의(Critical Realism)”입니다. 이는 현재 사회과학에서 가장 각광받는 이론 중의 하나로서, 무대 위에서 벌어지는 장면들뿐만 아니라 무대 백그라운드에서 벌어지는 더욱 복잡하고 세심한 메커니즘, 그리고 둘 사이의 상호작용을 통해 한 사회 현상이 어떻게 일어나는지를 가장 심도 있게 밝혀줄 수 있는 이론 중의 하나입니다.
5. 평가자의 관심과 저자의 의도의 충돌: 저는 오랜 기간 동안 나름 저명한 학술지에 논문을 출판해 왔으며, 다수의 학술지에서 논문 심사위원으로 활동하며 학술 연구의 평가 기준에 대한 경험적 이해를 쌓아왔습니다. 본 논문은 참고 문헌 목록을 포함하여 1만 자로 엄격히 제한된 소논문의 형식으로 기획되었기에, 이러한 형식적 제약은 본 논문이 다룰 수 있는 연구 범위와 깊이를 사전에 한정하고 있음을 밝힙니다.
저의 경험에 비추어 볼 때, 논문을 평가하는 데 가장 중요한 요소는 “저자의 관점”과 “연구 의도”를 중심으로 다음과 같은 논리적 구성의 일관성을 판단하는 것입니다.
저자가 의도하는 바에 따라 이론적, 방법론적으로 얼마나 논리적으로 작성되었는가.
설정된 연구 과제들을 한정된 지면 내에서 충실히 다루었는가.
본 논문은 명확하게 설정된 두 개의 연구 과제를 다루는 것을 목표로 하였습니다. 저자는 이 두 가지 과제를 제한된 분량 내에서 집중적으로 논하기 위해 연구의 범위를 의도적으로 좁혔습니다.
선생님께서 한국 교회 세습에 관한 깊은 지식이나 파워 엘리트 등의 특정 관심 이론을 바탕으로 본 논문을 바라보시는 것은, 제 연구에 새로운 국면을 제시해 주실 수 있는 귀중한 측면이 될 수 있음을 인지합니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 아쉬운 점은, 저의 짧은 논문에서 다루고자 하는 연구 의도를 대부분 밀어두시고, 평가자의 개인적인 관심이나 기존 지식이 작용한 듯한 인상을 받았다는 것입니다.
범위 확장 요구: 마치 "교회 세습에 관하여 최소한 책 1권 분량으로 쓰는 게 옳지 않았겠느냐"는 식의 물음을 하시는 듯한 인상을 줍니다. (이는 본 논문의 형식적 제약을 벗어난 요구입니다.)
제 논문을 '한편의 연극'이라는 메타포를 사용해 평가하신 점은 흥미롭습니다. 제 소견으로는, 논문 평가자가 저자의 의도와 논문의 형식적 제약을 존중하며 평가를 진행해 주시는 것이 바람직하다고 생각합니다. 연극의 연출 기획 의도와 관중의 평가는 다를 수 있지만, 선생님의 전문적인 비평이 해당 연구의 내재적 논리와 의도를 얼마나 객관적으로 파악했는지에 따라 그 가치가 부여된다고 판단합니다.
6. 교회 세습 문제의 연구 가치에 관하여, 일부에서는 교회 세습 비율이 아주 작은 비율이라고 말씀해 주셨습니다. 그러나 수백 개의 교회가 세습을 단행했으며, 이 세습 문제가 한국 기독교의 전반적인 이미지를 형성하는 데 매우 큰 부정적인 영향을 미쳤다는 사실은 부인하기 어렵습니다. 단 몇 개의 교회가 세습을 했을지라도 그것이 한국 교회에 미친 영향력이 지대하다면, 이는 충분히 연구할 가치를 제공한다고 생각하며, 이 부분에 대한 학문적 논의의 필요성을 강조하고 싶습니다.
다시 한번 귀한 논평에 깊이 감사드립니다.
한길수 드림
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무대 ‘뒤편’에도 조명을
한길수 교수의 “Hereditary Succession in South Korean Churches”에 대하여
교회의 목사직 세습은 한국의 시민사회가 교회를 비판적으로 바라보는 주요 항목의 하나다. 그럼에도 이에 대한 신학자들의 비판적 연구는 많지 않다. 그것은 교단신학교 외에는 이렇다 할 신학연구기관이 부재한 탓이다. 또한 분과학문체계가 여전히 견고한 학문제도로 자리잡고 있는 현실에서 신학적 논점은 비신학 영역에서는 거의 다뤄지지 않는다. 이는 신학자가 아닌, 개신교 전문가가 생존할 가능성이 매우 제한적임을 의미한다. 그런 점에서 종교와 커뮤니케이션 연구회의 존재는 높이 평가할 가치가 충분하다. 또 이런 꼼꼼한 논문을 제출한 저자의 노고에 신학연구자로 깊은 감사를 표한다.
이 글은 한 편의 연극이다. 치밀하고 냉철하다. 장르는 사회극. 극이 펼치는 신랄한 비평에 빠져들지 않을 수 없다. 그렇다고 그 스토리라인에 완전히 공감하는 것은 아니다. 곳곳에 틈이 엿보인다. 곳곳에 ‘작가’의 의도에 균열을 내고 싶은 욕구를 느낀다. 수없이 많은 빈틈을 비집고 들어간 나의 대사로 ‘작가’와 논쟁, 아니 대화하고 싶다.
아차, 정신을 차리자. 포럼이고, 논평자다. 주어진 시간은 10분. 말을 줄여야 한다. 내가 제일 하고 싶은 논점에만 집중하자. 내가 제일 아쉬웠던 것만 말해보자.
이 연극은, 내가 보기엔, 대사 속에, 동작 속에, 무대 셋트 속에, 무대 뒤편을 연상하게 하는, 그러니까 ‘오프 스테이지’(Off-stage) 기법을 담아내야, 그 비평이 진가를 발휘한다. 한데 나의 판단으로는, 아쉽게도 그렇게 느껴지지 않는다.
교회의 담임목사 세습(이하 ‘교회세습’)은 1990년대 이후 한국의 시민사회가 개신교를 비판적으로 보는 가장 강렬한 의제의 하나다. 뿐만 아니라 개신교 내부의 자정운동도 가장 집중적으로 다룬 의제의 하나였다. 한데, 저자가 제시하는 ‘교회세습’ 현황은 전체 교회의 0.4%를 넘지 않는다. 나의 조사에 의하면, 2011년 당시 0.5% 이하였다. 대형교회는 그보다 훨씬 높은 빈도를 보여, 6% 정도로 추산되었다. 2004년 당시 1.7%의 교회가 대형교회로 추정되는데, 2011년으로 환산하면 그 비율은 더 낮아졌을 것이다. 그러니 1.7% 이하의 대형교회가 12배나 높은 ‘교회세습’을 단행했다는 것이다. 하지만 그렇다고 해도 이렇게 낮은 비율의 ‘교회세습’으로 개신교 전체를 읽는 것은 지나친 과대평가가 아닐까. 그렇다면 이 글의 비평은 극소수의 교회만 단행한 ‘교회세습’이 왜 개신교 전체를 향한 비판적 논점이 될 수 있는지를 해명해야 한다. 내가 보기엔, 바로 그렇기 때문에 ‘교회세습’에 집중한 탓에, 보지 못했던, 아니 볼 수 없었던 것들을 조명하고 그것과 ‘교회세습’이 연관되어 있는 구조적 맥락을 해독해내는 것이 필요하다.
이것은, 커뮤니케이션학의 이론을 끌어오면, ‘프레이밍’(framing)에 관한 것이다. 나는 프레이밍의 ‘그림자 효과’(은폐효과, overshadowing)에 관한 주목할 만한 연구를 남긴 샨토 이옌가(Shanto Iyengar)의 ‘에피소드적 프레이밍’(episodic framing) 개념을 빌려서 나의 문제제기를 간략히 논해보려 한다.
저자는 그렇게 논지를 편 것은 아니지만, 내가 보기엔 이 글의 ‘교회세습’에 관한 비평도 에피소드적 프레이밍의 위험을 내포한다. 그 현상이 포함된 구조적 양상을 포괄적으로 살피는 데 충분히 성공하지 못했기 때문이다.
개신교의 대성장기 이전과 이후를 비교하는 한 연구에 의하면 1970년대 이전과 이후 개신교 목사의 담임목사 재임기간이 뚜렷히 변화했다. 이전에는 순회목회 현상이 보다 일반적인 관행이었다면 이후에는 한 교회에 장기간 재임하는 현상이 두드러지게 많아졌다. 한데 다른 연구에 의하면 목사의 장기간 재직 현상은 대형교회로 성장하는 교회에서 뚜렷이 나타난다. 그 외에도 교회의 가용자원에 대한 독점 현상과 가용자원을 성장에 투여하는 능력이 겹쳐지면서 대형교회가 탄생하게 되었다는 얘기다. 그렇게 대대적인 성장을 구가한 교회들이 대형교회의 대열에 진입하는 러시 현상이 일어난 시기는 대략 1980년 어간으로 보인다.
한데 대형교회 혹은 성장형 중형교회 목사들도 시간이 흐르면 은퇴하지 않을 수 없다. 교회법상 대략 70세가 되면 은퇴해야 한다. 그러면 당연히 세대교체가 이뤄지지 않을 수 없다. 한데 실은 그게 그리 단순하지 않다. 재임기간 동안 가용자원을 독점한 이가 자연스럽게 사라지는 일은 그리 쉽지 않기 때문이다. 해서 건강만 허락한다면 은퇴했음에도 사실상의 권력을 유지하는 경우가 적지 않다. 이때 ‘은퇴목사’ 제도가 권력 연장의 장치로 작동한다.
한편, 교회의 가용자원을 독점한 목사는 매우 높은 임금을 받는다. 뿐만 아니라 임금보다 훨씬 높은 수준의 기타소득을 받는다. 자녀의 학비와 사교육비, 유학비도 기타수입으로 책정되는 것은 관례다. 만약 자녀 중에 목회자의 길을 가는 이가 있다면, 그는 다른 이들보다 학벌이나 인맥의 후광을 톡톡히 누린다. 그런 이들 중 매우 소수가 ‘교회세습’의 수혜를 받는다. 하지만 목회자가 되든 다른 길을 가든 그는 사회의 파워엘리트의 대열에 진입하기에 매우 유리한 위치에 있다. 그러니까 ‘교회세습’만이 아니라, 다양한 특권적 기회를 공정하지 않은 과정을 통해 세습되는 현상을 가리키는 ‘권력세습’ 현상을 함께 살피는 것이 필요하다. 그럼에도 극소수의 목사에게 한정된 ‘교회세습’에 대한 비판적 의제에 집착하는 에피소드적 프레이밍은 이런 구조적 요인을 살피지 못하고, 다분히 도덕적인 논의로 빠져들 수 있다.
1990년대에 ‘교회세습’이 문제로 부각된 것처럼, ‘권력세습’ 현상도 그 시기와 깊은 연관이 있다. 특히 1997년 외환위기는 중요한 변동의 계기다. 그때를 기점으로 한국사회는 세계화의 격랑에 휘말려들었다. 세계화를 대표하는 이데올로기인 신자유주의는 ‘무한경쟁’의 인간학을 추구한다. 한데 실은 이 경쟁의 이데올로기는 철저히 불공정한 현실에 둘러싸여 있다. 출발선이 다르고 경쟁을 위한 가용자원의 형성도 차별적이다. 그런 자원경쟁은 ‘사적 연줄망’(closed social networks) 만들기 전쟁을 의미한다. 2천년대 어간부터 이런 연줄망 전쟁이 치열해졌다.
한데 바로 이 시기에 개신교는 매우 흥미로운 변화를 맞는다. 우선 초고속 성장세가 급격하게 멈추고 성장정체 내지는 역성장의 시대가 도래했다. 한데 놀랍게도 이 시기에 또 한 번의 대형교회 러시가 일어난다. 나는 1980년 어간의 러시와 2천년 어간의 러시를 구별하여, 각각을 선발대형교회(이하 ‘선발’)와 후발대형교회(이하 ‘후발’)라고 명명한 바 있다. ‘후발’은 강남권(강남, 강동, 분당)에 집중되어 있고, 다른 교회에서 이동한 중상위계층 신자들이 대대적으로 유입되면서 탄생했다. 이것은 ‘후발’이 사적 연줄망 만들기에 더 없이 유리한 사회적 장의 성격을 갖고 있음을 의미한다. 요컨대 ‘후발’ 현상은 파워엘리트가 되기 위한 치열한 경쟁의 시대정신과 종교성이 결합된 현상이라고 할 수 있다.
한편 ‘후발’과는 달리 ‘선발’은 대성장기에 농촌에서 도시로 이주한 이들이 대대적으로 개신교 신자가 됨으로서 출현했다. 하여 ‘선발’의 담임목사는 그야말로 군주적 지도력을 갖고 있다. 반면 ‘후발’의 경우엔 목사보다 훨씬 강력한 자원능력을 갖춘 이가 즐비하다. 즉 그런 영향력 있는 평신도를 유치하는 데 성공한 이가 성공한 ‘후발’의 목회자인 것이다. 그런 점에서 ‘후발’의 경우엔 ‘교회세습’ 현상이 현저히 적을 수밖에 없다. 담임목사가 압도적인 독점적 자원을 갖추고 있지 못한 경우가 대부분이기 때문이다.
여기서 우리는 ‘교회세습’에만 주목하면 볼 수 없는 또 하나의 문제에 직면하게 된다. 이 시기 한국사회 전반은 ‘권력세습’에 익숙해져 있다. 수많은 미디어들이 능력 있는 이들의 권력 세습을 선망하게 하는 담론을 널리 유포시켰다. 그럼에도 ‘교회세습’에 대해서는 사회 전체가 비판적인 시선을 아낌없이 퍼붓는다. 이러한 시각의 비대칭에서 ‘그림자효과’는 없을까. 혹 시민사회는 ‘교회세습’에 대한 비판을 통해 사회가 좀더 공정해지고 있다고 생각하게 되는 것은 아닐까. 관객이 연극의 무대 뒤편을 전혀 상상하지 못하는 것처럼 이미 만연되어 있는, 심지어 세습할 권력을 거의 갖고 있지 못한 이들조차 ‘권력세습’ 현상을 선망하고 있음에도, 그것이 불공정한 현상임을 눈치채지 못하게 하는 장치로 작동하는 것은 아닌가.
이 논문에서 나는 한 편의 연극을 상상했다. 나의 잘못된 관람 탓일지도 모르지만, 어쩌면 이 연극은 무대 뒤편을 전혀 상상하지 못하도록, 무대에만, 배우에만 집중하도록 설정되어 있는 것일 수 있다. 한데 말했듯이 이 사회극은 무대 뒤편을 연상해낼 수 있을 때 좀더 완벽한 비평이 될 수 있다. 해서 어쩌면 이 글이 보여주는 무대는 다음 극으로 이어지는, 그리고 그 다음으로 이어지는 사회극의 일부이면 좋겠다. 그렇다면 내가 말했던 무대 뒤편은 리볼빙 스테이지(revolving stage)의 다음 무대인 셈이다. 해서 현재의 무대에서 벌어지는 장면들에서 다음 무대의 이야기가 연상되고, 그 다음으로 이어지면서 보다 큰 틀의 사회극으로 완성되는 것이면 좋겠다. 그러면 나와 같은 부실한 관객은 더 완전한 사회극의 청중으로 사회를 읽어내는 기회를 얻게 될지도 모르겠다. □
출처: https://owal.tistory.com/750 [올빼미의 밥상(김진호. 민중신학자):티스토리]
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아래는 업로드하신 논문 <‘The Church that Laid the Golden Eggs’: Catalysts for Hereditary Succession in South Korea’s Protestant Church>(Gil-Soo Han)을 바탕으로 한 <800단어 안팎 요약+평론>입니다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
<요약>(Korean, 약 800단어)
이 글은 한국 개신교에서 ‘담임목사직 세습(교회세습)’이 왜 1990년대 이후 두드러지게 증가했고, 어떤 조건이 그것을 가능하게 하며, 그 결과가 무엇인지 설명하려는 사회과학적 분석이다. 저자는 ‘세습’을 단순한 내부 인사문제가 아니라, 교회가 돈·권력·지위를 둘러싼 세속적 문화에 어떻게 포섭되었는지를 보여주는 징후로 다룬다. 특히 경제성장으로 교회가 부유해진 뒤 오히려 핵심 가치에서 이탈했고, 불황과 경쟁이 심화된 시대에 담임목사와 아들이 교회를 ‘수익사업체’처럼 통제하려는 동기가 커졌다고 본다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
방법론적으로 저자는 2000년부터 2024년까지 뉴스 데이터(KINDS)에서 ‘교회세습’ 관련 기사 72건과 사설 24건을 수집하고, 추가로 관련 문헌·인터넷 뉴스·그리고 학자·목회자·기자 6명 인터뷰를 결합했다. 분석은 근거이론 방식(open/axial/selective coding)과 NVivo를 사용해 범주화·연결·통합을 수행하며, ‘교회세습에 대한 반응’이 핵심 범주로 설정된다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
이론 틀은 두 축으로 구성된다. 첫째, 리처드 니버의 <그리스도와 문화>를 활용해 교회가 ‘그리스도(신앙의 가치)’와 ‘문화(사회 전반의 관행·가치·조직)’ 사이에서 어떤 방식으로 관계 맺는지 유형화한다. 저자는 이를 ‘자석의 N극(그리스도)과 S극(문화) 사이의 철판(교회)’이라는 비유 모델로 재구성해, 교회가 균형을 잃고 문화에 붙어버리면 ‘빛과 소금’의 매개 기능을 상실한다고 주장한다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
둘째, 마거릿 아처의 비판적 실재론·형태발생(morphogenesis) 관점을 통해 구조(경제·계급·제도)와 문화(경쟁·박탈감·유교적 권위·샤머니즘적 축복 추구), 그리고 행위자(담임목사·장로·교인)의 상호작용이 세습을 촉진/정당화/저지하는 메커니즘을 설명한다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
핵심 발견은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 교회는 ‘그리스도와 문화’라는 이중 요구를 조화시키려 한다고 말하지만, 실제로는 성장·확장·유지라는 목표가 ‘비타협적’ 우선순위가 되어 ‘이중 잣대’로 보이게 된다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
둘째, 세습을 가능케 하는 교회 내부 요인은 비민주적 의사결정, 담임목사 중심 권력, 장로들의 편향, 성차별, 폐쇄적 네트워크, 그리고 ‘축복-성공’에 강하게 결합된 샤머니즘적 신앙 형태다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
셋째, 교회 외부 구조는 1990년대 이후 신자유주의적 불안정·경쟁·상대적 박탈감이며, 이 환경에서 종교조직도 ‘기업 윤리’를 닮아가며 부를 더 추구하게 된다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
저자는 대표 사례로 명성교회 사건을 상세히 다루며, 분립교회 설립→아들의 담임 취임→교단 재판과 사회적 반발의 연쇄가 ‘정당한 절차를 밟았다’는 교회 주장과 ‘공공 윤리를 배반했다’는 사회 인식이 충돌하는 장면이라고 본다. 이때 대중은 종교기관에 ‘기업보다 높은 윤리’(더 엄격한 기대)를 부여하기 때문에, 절차적 외피가 있어도 세습은 ‘사유화’와 ‘특권의 대물림’으로 읽힌다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
마지막으로 저자는 세습이 교회 쇠퇴를 가속한다고 본다. 실제로 주요 교단에서 신도 감소가 보고되며, 세습은 특히 청년층 이탈을 부추기는 요인으로 제시된다. 해결책으로는 담임 승계의 공정한 절차 확립(외부 전문 검색 등), 재정 투명성 강화, 그리고 “예수를 믿는 것에서 예수를 따르는 것으로”라는 윤리적 전환이 제안된다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
<평론>(Korean)
이 글의 강점은 ‘세습’이라는 도덕적 분노의 대상을 단순 비난으로 끝내지 않고, <구조·문화·행위자>의 결합이 어떻게 종교조직을 ‘사기업화’하는지 설명하려 한 점이다. 특히 니버의 신학적 틀을 사회과학 분석에 연결하고, 이를 자석-철판 모델로 구체화한 대목은 ‘교회의 정체성 위기’를 직관적으로 전달한다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
또한 뉴스·사설·인터뷰를 혼합한 자료 구성은 ‘공적 담론에서 세습이 어떻게 문제화되는지’를 포착하는 데 적합하다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
다만 한계도 분명하다. 첫째, 뉴스자료 중심 분석은 ‘드러난 사건’과 ‘주목받는 대형교회’에 편향될 수 있다. 세습이 없거나 저항이 성공한 교회의 내부 역동(예: 대안적 거버넌스, 재정 공개, 교인 민주주의)이 비교 사례로 더 들어오면 인과 설명이 더 단단해질 것이다. 둘째, ‘유교·샤머니즘’ 요인은 설명력이 크지만, 그것이 단지 ‘한국적 전통의 잔재’로 소비될 위험도 있다. 같은 전통이 왜 어떤 교회에서는 권위주의를 강화하고, 다른 교회에서는 공동체 윤리로 전환되는지(조건부 작동 메커니즘)를 더 섬세하게 보여주면 좋겠다. 셋째, 세습을 ‘시모니(성직매매)’의 현대적 형태로 읽는 해석은 문제의식을 날카롭게 하지만, 현실에서는 ‘법적 소유구조·세무·재단·교단 헌법’ 같은 제도적 층위가 더 직접적 촉매가 될 수 있으니, 제도 분석 파트를 보강하면 정책적 함의가 커질 것이다.
그럼에도 결론은 설득력 있다. 한국 개신교의 세습은 ‘몇몇 목회자의 일탈’이라기보다, 성장주의·불투명한 재정·권위주의 문화·경쟁사회가 만나 만들어낸 결과이며, 그 비용은 신뢰 상실과 쇠퇴로 되돌아온다.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
<English summary + brief review>(short, for parallel reading)
This article explains why hereditary succession of senior pastors has expanded in South Korean Protestant churches since the 1990s, and why it has become publicly scandalous. Using a mixed dataset (news reports and editorials from 2000–2024 plus interviews), Han argues that rapid church enrichment and later economic insecurity encouraged leaders to treat churches as quasi-private enterprises—protecting revenue, status, and organizational control—often in collusion with their sons.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
The theoretical contribution combines <Richard Niebuhr’s> “Christ and culture” with <Margaret Archer’s> morphogenetic (structure–culture–agency) framework. Han’s “magnet” metaphor depicts the church pulled between Christ-like ethical commitments and secular cultural logics; when it fuses with “culture,” it loses its mediating credibility.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
Structural pressures (neoliberal competition, inequality, relative deprivation) and internal church cultures (authoritarian governance, elder bias, gender inequality, Confucianized authority, prosperity-oriented/shamanistic spirituality) jointly facilitate succession.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
A flagship case (Myungsung Church) illustrates how procedural legality can still appear as a “double standard,” because the public expects religious institutions to meet higher ethical standards than corporations.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
The outcome is disillusionment and accelerated decline; Han highlights membership losses and youth disengagement, and suggests fairer succession processes and stronger accountability.
‘The Church that Laid the Golde…
Review: The paper’s strength is its multi-level explanation (society + institution + actors) and its bridge between theology and social science. A limitation is potential media-case bias toward large, visible churches; adding systematic comparison with non-succession or reform-success cases would sharpen causality and policy implications.
원하시면, 이 논문을 세진님이 쓰시는 <요약+평론> 포맷(예: 핵심 논지 5개, 근거 5개, 반론 3개, 함의 5개)으로 재구성해드릴게요.
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제미나이
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김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succession in South Korean Churches.pdf
PDF
코멘트 해주세요
코멘트 해주세요
===
세진님, 공유해주신 파일은 한길수 교수의 논문에 대한 김진호 민중신학자의 논평과 그에 대한 한 교수의 반론을 담고 있습니다. 지난번 요약해 드린 논문의 내용에 더해, 학계 내에서 이 연구가 어떻게 받아들여지고 어떤 논쟁이 있었는지 알 수 있는 흥미로운 자료입니다.
요청하신 대로, 김진호 신학자의 비판적 시각과 한길수 교수의 방어 논리를 중심으로 정리한 코멘트를 <해라> 체로 작성하였습니다.
요약 및 평론: 학문적 경계에서 벌어진 비판과 성찰
1. 김진호의 비판: 에피소드적 프레이밍의 위험성
김진호는 한길수 교수의 연구가 개별적인 <교회 세습>이라는 현상에 과도하게 집중함으로써, 그 이면에 숨겨진 더 큰 구조적 모순인 <권력 세습>을 놓치고 있다고 지적한다
통계적 과대평가: 한국 교회 중 세습을 단행한 곳은 전체의 0.5% 미만이며, 대형 교회 중에서도 일부에 불과하다
. 따라서 세습에만 초점을 맞추는 것은 개신교 전체를 읽어내는 데 있어 착시 현상을 일으킬 수 있다 . 그림자 효과(Overshadowing): 시민사회가 <교회 세습>을 비난하는 데 열중하는 사이, 사회 전반에 만연한 능력주의(Meritocracy) 기반의 권력 세습과 사적 연줄망 전쟁이라는 본질적인 불공정함은 오히려 은폐될 수 있다
. 구조적 맥락의 부재: 1997년 외환위기 이후 신자유주의적 무한경쟁 체제가 교회 내부에 어떻게 작동했는지, 그리고 파워 엘리트들이 교회라는 장(field)을 어떻게 이용하는지에 대한 포괄적인 분석이 부족하다는 평가다
.
2. 한길수의 반론: 고전의 가치와 비판적 사실주의
한길수 교수는 김진호의 지적에 대해 연구의 의도와 학문적 방법론의 차이를 강조하며 조목조목 반박한다
연구의 상징성: 세습 교회의 비율이 낮더라도, 그것이 한국 기독교의 전체적인 이미지 형성에 미친 부정적인 영향력은 지대하기 때문에 충분한 연구 가치가 있다
. 비판적 사실주의(Critical Realism): 리처드 니버의 이론이 <낡았다>는 비판에 대해, 자신은 고전의 가치를 중시하며 특히 사회과학적 깊이를 더해주는 <비판적 사실주의>를 근간으로 무대 뒤편의 복잡한 메커니즘을 분석했음을 명시한다
. 형식적 제약과 의도: 해당 논문은 엄격한 분량 제한이 있는 소논문 형식이었기에 모든 사회 현상을 포괄할 수 없었으며, 평가자는 저자의 의도와 논리적 일관성을 먼저 존중해야 한다고 주장한다
.
종합 평론: 무대 위 배우와 무대 뒤 구조 사이의 팽팽한 긴장
이 논쟁은 한국 사회를 바라보는 두 학자의 시각 차이를 극명하게 보여준다. 한길수는 세습이라는 **<사건>**이 갖는 폭발력과 종교적 상징성에 주목하여 현상을 세밀하게 해부한 반면, 김진호는 그 사건이 일어나는 **<구조>**와 사회 전체의 파워 엘리트 지형도라는 더 큰 지도를 그리려 한다.
김진호가 제안한 <리볼빙 스테이지(Revolving Stage, 회전 무대)>의 비유는 탁월하다
반면, 한길수 교수의 반론 역시 정당한 지점이 있다. 모든 논문이 사회 전체의 구조를 담아낼 수는 없다. 오히려 세습이라는 구체적인 <에피소드>를 통해 대중이 느끼는 상실감과 교회의 위선을 날카롭게 도려내는 작업은 그 자체로 사회적 환부를 드러내는 중요한 역할을 한다.
결론적으로, 두 학자의 대화는 한국 교회의 세습 문제를 단순한 내부 비리가 아닌, 한국 사회의 일그러진 욕망이 종교라는 거울에 투영된 결과물로 이해하게 만든다. 세진님께서 보시기에, 교회를 떠난 세계인으로서의 시각에서 이들의 논쟁 중 어느 쪽이 더 설득력 있게 다가오시는지 궁금하다.
추가로 김진호 신학자가 언급한 <선발 대형 교회>와 <후발 대형 교회>의 차이에 대해 더 구체적인 분석이 필요하시면 말씀해 주세요. Would you like me to explain more about the difference between these two types of churches?
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챗
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아래 코멘트는 업로드하신 <김진호, “무대 ‘뒤편’에도 조명을 – 한길수 교수의 ‘Hereditary Succession…’에 대하여”(2025.10.19)> 텍스트 자체에 근거해 정리한 것입니다.
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
<코멘트>(Korean)
1) 이 글이 실제로 “잘한 것”
<자기 수정과 사과를 공개적으로 수행한 점>
글 초반부에서 필자는 자신의 이전 표현(“종합적으로 읽어내는 안목이 잘 보이지 않았다”, “낡은 이론” 등)이 과했고, 모욕이 될 수 있었음을 인정하고 사과합니다. 이 부분은 논쟁을 “인신”에서 “논점”으로 되돌리는, 매우 중요한 윤리적 제스처입니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
<비평의 핵심을 ‘도덕 비난’이 아니라 ‘프레이밍’으로 옮겨놓은 점>
필자는 한길수 논문이 ‘교회세습’이라는 사건(에피소드)에 집중하면서, 그 사건이 가리는 “그림자 효과(overshadowing)”를 낳을 수 있다고 말합니다. 이건 “세습은 나쁘다” 같은 1차 도덕판정에서 한 단계 올라가, <어떤 문제틀이 무엇을 보이게/안 보이게 하는가>라는 분석 질문을 제기합니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
<‘교회세습’과 ‘권력세습’의 연결을 요구한 점>
필자는 교회세습이 극소수 현상(전체 교회의 0.4~0.5% 수준)이라면, 왜 그것이 개신교 전체를 상징적으로 타격하는지, 그리고 더 넓은 ‘권력세습’(엘리트 재생산) 구조와 어떻게 이어지는지를 밝혀야 한다고 주장합니다. “세습”을 종교 내부의 도덕 스캔들이 아니라, 한국 사회의 엘리트 경쟁·불평등·연줄망 구축과 연결된 현상으로 읽어내려는 시도는 분명 생산적입니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
<대형교회 형성의 ‘두 물결(1980년대/2000년대)’ 구분은 통찰적>
필자는 1980년대 전후의 ‘선발 대형교회’(농촌→도시 이주민 기반, 군주적 담임목사 권위)와 2000년대의 ‘후발 대형교회’(강남권 중상층 이동, 평신도 자원력 강함)를 구분합니다. 이 구분은 “왜 어떤 유형에서는 세습이 많고(선발), 어떤 유형에서는 상대적으로 적은가(후발)”를 설명하는 가설로 기능할 수 있습니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
2) 이 글의 논지에서 “약한 고리”
<0.4% 논증의 함정: ‘비율’이 아니라 ‘영향력’이 핵심일 수 있음>
필자는 “너무 낮은 비율로 개신교 전체를 읽는 건 과대평가”라고 말합니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
하지만 사회학적으로는 <낮은 발생률 + 매우 큰 상징적/제도적 영향>이 흔합니다. 대형교회·교단 정치·미디어 노출·재정 규모가 결합되면 ‘적은 사례’가 ‘큰 신뢰 손상’을 만들 수 있습니다. 즉, 필자가 제기한 문제(왜 작은 비율이 큰 의제가 되는가)는 맞는데, 그 결론이 “그러니 과대평가”로 곧장 가면 논리가 짧아집니다. 오히려 이 지점이야말로 <프레이밍 경쟁>과 <공적 윤리 기대의 비대칭>을 실증적으로 풀어야 하는 핵심 과제가 됩니다.<‘에피소드적 프레이밍’ 비판이, 역으로 과잉 확장 요구가 될 위험>
필자는 “교회세습에 현미경을 대기보다 권력세습 관점이 더 필요”하다고 주장합니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
이 요구는 연구 확장의 방향으로는 훌륭하지만, 한길수 교수의 반론 편지에서 지적하듯, 원 논문이 ‘소논문’ 형식과 연구 의도를 갖고 있다면(분량·과제 제한), 비평이 “그 논문이 하려던 것”을 평가하기보다 “내가 원했던 다른 논문”을 요구하는 방식으로 읽힐 수 있습니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
해결책은 간단합니다. 비평을 <내재적 평가>와 <외재적 확장 제안>으로 분리해 쓰면 됩니다. 즉, “그 논문이 약속한 목표를 달성했는가?”를 먼저 판정하고, 그 다음에 “다음 논문/책에서는 권력세습 프레임으로 이렇게 확장하자”를 제안하면, 논점이 더 강해집니다.<핵심 가설 몇 개가 ‘자료/근거 제시’ 없이 서술로만 남아 있음>
예를 들어 “후발 대형교회는 평신도 자원력이 강해 세습이 적다”는 가설은 설득력 있지만, 실제 통계나 사례 비교가 붙지 않으면 ‘좋은 이야기’에서 멈춥니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
필자의 글은 “토론문”이어서 이해되지만, 만약 이 글을 학술적 개입으로 키우려면, <대형교회 유형별 세습 빈도>, <강남권 교회 이동 데이터>, <교단별 세습 규정과 적용 사례> 같은 근거가 뒤따라야 합니다.
3) 한길수 교수의 반론 편지가 보여주는 “논쟁의 핵”
한길수 교수 편지의 요지는 “해외 연구자/언어 능력 폄하”와 “낡은 이론”이라는 평가 방식이 부당하고, 자신의 논문은 이미 Q1 학술지에 엄격한 심사를 거쳐 출판됐으며, 니버는 ‘얼굴’이고 핵심 이론은 비판적 실재론이라는 점, 그리고 소논문 형식의 제약 속에서 <저자의 의도와 논리적 일관성>으로 평가해달라는 요청입니다.
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
이 반론은 “연구 윤리(평가의 공정성)”에 관한 문제제기이자, “비평의 방법”에 관한 교정입니다. 필자(김진호)가 사과문에서 이를 수용한 것은 적절합니다.
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
4) 세진님이 이 글을 “앞으로” 어떻게 쓰면 좋은가
<프레이밍 논쟁의 교본>으로 쓰기
“교회세습 프레임”이 무엇을 드러내고 무엇을 가리는지(그림자 효과)
“권력세습 프레임”이 무엇을 더 잘 설명하는지(엘리트 재생산, 경쟁체제, 연줄망)
이 둘을 비교해, 한 편의 에세이나 소논문(1,500~2,000단어)으로 충분히 확장 가능합니다.
<연구 평가의 기준>을 뽑아내기
한길수 교수 편지에 들어있는 “논문 평가는 저자의 의도·형식적 제약·논리적 일관성 중심”이라는 기준은, 세진님이 앞으로 ‘요약+평론’을 쓰실 때도 그대로 적용 가능합니다.김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
<후속 연구 질문 5개> (이 글이 자연스럽게 던지는 것)
대형교회 ‘선발/후발’ 유형별로 실제 세습 비율은 얼마나 다른가?
세습이 적은 교회는 어떤 거버넌스·재정 투명성을 갖고 있나?
사회 전체의 ‘권력세습’ 관행에는 관대하면서 ‘교회세습’에는 엄격한 비대칭은 왜 생기나?
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
미디어는 교회세습을 어떤 서사(탐사보도/도덕극/정치극)로 구성했나?
교회 내부 자정운동은 어떤 조건에서 성공/실패하나?
<Commentary>(English)
This text is valuable because it moves from moral denunciation to an analytic critique of <framing>. Kim argues that focusing on “pastoral succession” as an episode can produce an “overshadowing effect,” hiding the broader structure of elite reproduction (“power succession”) under neoliberal competition and closed networks.
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
Its strongest insight is the proposed distinction between “early-wave megachurches” (1980s, strong pastoral dominance) and “late-wave megachurches” (2000s, affluent districts, powerful lay resources), offered as a mechanism for variation in succession patterns.
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
Two weak links stand out. First, the “only 0.4%” claim risks treating prevalence as the key metric, when symbolic impact and resource concentration may matter more.
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
Second, the framing critique can become an implicit demand for a different paper, rather than an internal evaluation of what the original short-format article set out to do—precisely the point Han raises in his response letter about authorial intent and formal constraints.
김진호 - 한길수 교수의 Hereditary Succes…
Overall, read this as a strong <agenda-setting intervention>: it identifies what the next-stage research should test empirically (megachurch typologies, media narratives, and the asymmetry between how society judges religious vs secular inheritance).
원하시면, 이 김진호 글의 핵심 논지를 “세진님 스타일”로 <1) 핵심 주장 5개 2) 근거 5개 3) 논리의 약점 5개 4) 후속 연구 설계 1장> 형태로 더 압축해드리겠습니다.
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한길수
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Asian Studies Review Volume 50, 2026 - Issue 1
Open access
1,190 Views
‘The Church that Laid the Golden Eggs’: Catalysts for Hereditary Succession in South Korea’s Protestant Church
Gil-Soo Han
Pages 81-100 | Received 01 Aug 2024, Accepted 29 Apr 2025, Published online: 21 Jul 2025
Cite this article
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2025.2526045
CrossMark
ABSTRACT
With South Korea’s rapid economic development, its Protestant churches grew exponentially until the mid-1990s. Koreans enjoyed more disposable income as the economy flourished, and the church became wealthier. This, however, led to a deviation from its core values. A notable trend has been the hereditary succession of head ministers in many churches. This article analyses news reports from 2000 to 2022 to explore why this hereditary practice has occurred, identify the socio-cultural and economic factors, both within and outside the church, that have driven this phenomenon, and assess its broader impact and implications.
Asian Studies Review Volume 50, 2026 - Issue 1
Open access
1,190 Views
‘The Church that Laid the Golden Eggs’: Catalysts for Hereditary Succession in South Korea’s Protestant Church
Gil-Soo Han
Pages 81-100 | Received 01 Aug 2024, Accepted 29 Apr 2025, Published online: 21 Jul 2025
Cite this article
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2025.2526045
CrossMark
ABSTRACT
With South Korea’s rapid economic development, its Protestant churches grew exponentially until the mid-1990s. Koreans enjoyed more disposable income as the economy flourished, and the church became wealthier. This, however, led to a deviation from its core values. A notable trend has been the hereditary succession of head ministers in many churches. This article analyses news reports from 2000 to 2022 to explore why this hereditary practice has occurred, identify the socio-cultural and economic factors, both within and outside the church, that have driven this phenomenon, and assess its broader impact and implications.
The analysis reveals that
- Korean Protestantism has increasingly merged with secular culture in pursuit of material benefits such as wealth and power, all under the guise of Christian values.
- In a sluggish economy, head ministers, often in collusion with their sons, have sought to control churches as profitable enterprises and protect the interests of individualistic congregations.
- Factors such as undemocratic decision-making, church elders’ bias towards head pastors, gender inequality, neo-Confucian traditions, and prosperity-driven shamanistic spirituality have fuelled this trend.
- As a result, many churchgoers have become disillusioned, and the already negative public perception of Christianity has worsened, accelerating church decline and tarnishing its reputation among Korean religions.
KEYWORDS:
Korean Protestantism
simony
hereditary succession (heredity)
head ministers
Richard Niebuhr
Christ
culture
pariah capitalism
secularisation
critical realism
Previous articleView issue table of contentsNext article
Introduction
The serious disease of the Korean church, cancer that kills the Korean church, has emerged today as a pastor’s inheritance (Kim Myeong-Yong, President of Presbyterian Theological Seminary, cited in Ji, Citation2012).
The Korean church will live only if Isaac is killed, and it is also the way to save Isaac (Shin, Citation2013).
Korean Protestantism today suffers from a devastatingly negative image, especially in comparison to other major religions – namely, Buddhism and Catholicism – and is typically referred to as ‘selfish’, ‘materialistic’, and ‘authoritarian’. Moreover, Korean Protestantism is the most poorly ranked religion when it comes to the quality of its leaders and public expectations of a positive contribution to society. One of the most conspicuous practices is the hereditary of head pastorship. Between 1970 and 2009, 159 churches completed hereditary successions (Min, Citation2018), and between 2010 and 2018, 205 churches completed such a succession, which was double the number in the previous decade (Min, Citation2018).
Simony broadly refers to the purchase of church offices or priesthoods, or the misuse of religious authority for monetary gain. Simony was occasionally practised in early Christianity under oppression but was not significant enough to pollute the church (Seon, Citation1996, 50). Early Christian leaders were devoted to Jesus Christ’s teachings, with some becoming martyrs instead of seeking glory and power, especially before Constantine’s religious tolerance in AD 313. Afterwards, the church gained land, donations, and political influence, gradually leading to corruption. The priesthood became central to both religious and worldly authority, contributing to the church’s decline (Seon, Citation1996, 50–51). The sale of priesthoods and hereditary succession greatly tarnished the medieval church. This practice, which is often called a ‘chronic disease’, has plagued Christianity throughout its history (Seon, Citation1996, 83).
The church’s misuse of religious authority led to widespread regulations against simony across Europe and nearby regions. In AD 347, the Church Council in Sophia condemned bribery in bishopric elections, and in AD 341, the Antioch Church Council forbade dying Bishops from appointing successors. The 4th-century Apostolic Canons also banned Bishops from passing on their positions to family members or acquaintances (Schieffer, 2000, 277, cited in Wi, Citation2020, 11). The Lateran Council in the 12th century announced the clergy’s celibacy to ensure that priests could not pass on church assets or property to their children (Sieben, 1990, 482, cited in Wi, Citation2020, 15). Simony was prevalent between the 13th and 15th centuries, becoming a stimulus to the Protestant Reformation in the 1500s. John of Fordun from Scotland noted cases of simony, such as an abbot who acquired his position through unreasonable persuasion, one who passed on his position to his nephew, and another who took the initiative for the latter without a monetary reward (MacLean, Citation1987; Wi, Citation2020, 12). According to Brown (Citation2015, 96), indulgence emerged from the common belief that ‘almsgiving was an obligatory pious practice because it had an expiatory function. Alms atoned for sins’ and ‘the rich members in the Christian communities of the West [made] donations designed to protect their souls and those of their relatives and loved ones’ (Brown, Citation2015, 20). Indulgence was practised in diverse forms over time. In the 16th century, it became a significant source of income for popes and Bishops. For example, during the Avignon papacy in France (1309–1377), the Vatican had more revenue than the kings of France. The Catholic Church used two-thirds of the income in its fight to regain the Vatican in Italy, which is the epitome of simony (Bainton, Citation1966, 231, cited in Seon, Citation1996, 68). Indulgence, a form of simony in the medieval era, evolved mainly from a shared belief about the afterlife and wealth.
Since its introduction to Korea in 1884, Korean Protestantism (together with the earlier established Roman Catholicism) has made a remarkable contribution to the modernisation of Korea in areas such as education, medical services, and overcoming undesirable traditions such as a closed class system, gender inequality, and early marriage (Noh, Citation1994a; Oak, Citation2016). No cases of simony were recorded or attracted public attention until rapid development and urbanisation in the 1970s. Hereditary succession has become a notable concern in Korean Christianity since the early 1990s, however, when Koreans started reaping the fruits of diligent work for decades, enjoying disposable income and travelling overseas. In Korea, hereditary succession refers to the passing of head ministerships to one’s children, although this often occurs through a nominal process (Kim, Citation2016, 99) that is geared towards privatising the church community and its resources, thus destroying what the church is. In 2012 and 2013, several national religious organisations tried without success to establish the Anti-Hereditary Succession Regulation, which was intended to prohibit churches from appointing the spouses and descendants of pastors or elders within five years of their resignation or retirement. Against this backdrop, this article attempts to answer three questions:
simony
hereditary succession (heredity)
head ministers
Richard Niebuhr
Christ
culture
pariah capitalism
secularisation
critical realism
Previous articleView issue table of contentsNext article
Introduction
The serious disease of the Korean church, cancer that kills the Korean church, has emerged today as a pastor’s inheritance (Kim Myeong-Yong, President of Presbyterian Theological Seminary, cited in Ji, Citation2012).
The Korean church will live only if Isaac is killed, and it is also the way to save Isaac (Shin, Citation2013).
Korean Protestantism today suffers from a devastatingly negative image, especially in comparison to other major religions – namely, Buddhism and Catholicism – and is typically referred to as ‘selfish’, ‘materialistic’, and ‘authoritarian’. Moreover, Korean Protestantism is the most poorly ranked religion when it comes to the quality of its leaders and public expectations of a positive contribution to society. One of the most conspicuous practices is the hereditary of head pastorship. Between 1970 and 2009, 159 churches completed hereditary successions (Min, Citation2018), and between 2010 and 2018, 205 churches completed such a succession, which was double the number in the previous decade (Min, Citation2018).
Simony broadly refers to the purchase of church offices or priesthoods, or the misuse of religious authority for monetary gain. Simony was occasionally practised in early Christianity under oppression but was not significant enough to pollute the church (Seon, Citation1996, 50). Early Christian leaders were devoted to Jesus Christ’s teachings, with some becoming martyrs instead of seeking glory and power, especially before Constantine’s religious tolerance in AD 313. Afterwards, the church gained land, donations, and political influence, gradually leading to corruption. The priesthood became central to both religious and worldly authority, contributing to the church’s decline (Seon, Citation1996, 50–51). The sale of priesthoods and hereditary succession greatly tarnished the medieval church. This practice, which is often called a ‘chronic disease’, has plagued Christianity throughout its history (Seon, Citation1996, 83).
The church’s misuse of religious authority led to widespread regulations against simony across Europe and nearby regions. In AD 347, the Church Council in Sophia condemned bribery in bishopric elections, and in AD 341, the Antioch Church Council forbade dying Bishops from appointing successors. The 4th-century Apostolic Canons also banned Bishops from passing on their positions to family members or acquaintances (Schieffer, 2000, 277, cited in Wi, Citation2020, 11). The Lateran Council in the 12th century announced the clergy’s celibacy to ensure that priests could not pass on church assets or property to their children (Sieben, 1990, 482, cited in Wi, Citation2020, 15). Simony was prevalent between the 13th and 15th centuries, becoming a stimulus to the Protestant Reformation in the 1500s. John of Fordun from Scotland noted cases of simony, such as an abbot who acquired his position through unreasonable persuasion, one who passed on his position to his nephew, and another who took the initiative for the latter without a monetary reward (MacLean, Citation1987; Wi, Citation2020, 12). According to Brown (Citation2015, 96), indulgence emerged from the common belief that ‘almsgiving was an obligatory pious practice because it had an expiatory function. Alms atoned for sins’ and ‘the rich members in the Christian communities of the West [made] donations designed to protect their souls and those of their relatives and loved ones’ (Brown, Citation2015, 20). Indulgence was practised in diverse forms over time. In the 16th century, it became a significant source of income for popes and Bishops. For example, during the Avignon papacy in France (1309–1377), the Vatican had more revenue than the kings of France. The Catholic Church used two-thirds of the income in its fight to regain the Vatican in Italy, which is the epitome of simony (Bainton, Citation1966, 231, cited in Seon, Citation1996, 68). Indulgence, a form of simony in the medieval era, evolved mainly from a shared belief about the afterlife and wealth.
Since its introduction to Korea in 1884, Korean Protestantism (together with the earlier established Roman Catholicism) has made a remarkable contribution to the modernisation of Korea in areas such as education, medical services, and overcoming undesirable traditions such as a closed class system, gender inequality, and early marriage (Noh, Citation1994a; Oak, Citation2016). No cases of simony were recorded or attracted public attention until rapid development and urbanisation in the 1970s. Hereditary succession has become a notable concern in Korean Christianity since the early 1990s, however, when Koreans started reaping the fruits of diligent work for decades, enjoying disposable income and travelling overseas. In Korea, hereditary succession refers to the passing of head ministerships to one’s children, although this often occurs through a nominal process (Kim, Citation2016, 99) that is geared towards privatising the church community and its resources, thus destroying what the church is. In 2012 and 2013, several national religious organisations tried without success to establish the Anti-Hereditary Succession Regulation, which was intended to prohibit churches from appointing the spouses and descendants of pastors or elders within five years of their resignation or retirement. Against this backdrop, this article attempts to answer three questions:
- Why has hereditary succession occurred in the Korean church, and what has sustained the practice?
- What are the catalysts and obstacles to hereditary succession?
- And what are its impact and implications?
Literature Review
Hereditary succession in contemporary Korean Christianity is a serious concern and is well-researched in Korean scholarship, but not elsewhere. There are three main strands of scholarship on hereditary succession within the church:
- historical,
- theological or ministerial, and
- economic perspectives.
These approaches’ key characteristics and their shortcomings are discussed below.
First, Bae’s (Citation2013, 85–86) historical viewpoints note that South Korea accomplished rapid industrialisation after its independence from Japanese imperialism, and the Protestant church pursued prosperity most effectively by utilising Korean-style pariah capitalism (cheonmin jabonjuui), combined with indigenous shamanism (Grayson, Citation1995; Kim, Citation2013, 8–13; Citation2006; cf. Cox, Citation1995, 221–226). Korea’s rapid economic growth enabled the emergence of numerous mega-churches, making quantitative growth the most desired ethos and a sign of success. Consequently, frugality and sacrifice as Christian values were considered unrealistic and contemptible; realistic logic, meritocracy, and selfish desire became the central ethos of the Christian ministry (Bae, Citation2013, 85–86).
According to Bae, the senior pastors pursuing heredity have been theologically and politically conservative – in modern Korea, represented by the Presbyterian Church of Korea (and especially its Tonghap, Hapdong, and Goshin denominations), the Baptist Church, and the Full Gospel Church. The conservatives are ahistorical, otherworldly-oriented, evangelical and politically far-right, indifferent to national politics, submissive to conservative government authorities, and pro-American (Ryu, Citation2004). The senior pastors have either founded their churches or served them for decades with absolute control; hereditary succession occurs predominantly in the capital and urban areas (Bae, Citation2013, 96–97).
There is a missing link between Korea’s economic growth and the emergence of the affluent and mega-churches, resulting from the churchgoers’ access to increasing disposable income and their desire to accumulate wealth, backed up by prosperity theology. It is worth establishing the links between emergent structural and cultural properties in Korean society and their intersections with high Christian and worldly values (Archer, Citation1995; Niebuhr, Citation1951).
Second, theology and ministerial reasons for leadership development and succession are essential to a healthy congregation’s ministry. Ministerial studies note the problems of father-to-son succession, such as nepotism, which prevents better qualified people from leading the church (Birmingham Bureau, Citation2011; Hartley, Citation2012, 17). While Confucianism is embedded in Korean life for the sake of collectivism, the desire for individualistic pursuit and life opportunities is strong enough to cause resentment of privileges not well grounded in merit. Others note that heredity helps to ensure the stability of leadership, and leadership succession with an appropriate qualification and process does not amount to the heresy of simony. It has been considered justifiable, as shown by some successful cases of heredity, and facilitated by the influential Confucian habitus (Chae, Citation2021, 77). Immediate queries against Confucian habitus and exclusive familism could imply that such self-serving application of Confucianism against other families can cause friction and destabilise religious organisations (Deuchler, Citation1992; Yun, Citation2020). The underlying reasons for seeking heredity may be more than ministerial harmony.
Third, the economic perspectives of the Korean churches focus on issues such as their corporatisation and privatisation: in this view, the ministry is a business, the church is an industry, a minister is a business person, the churchgoer is a customer, the gospel is a product, worship service is a performance, and offering is a payment of the price of the product (Chung, Citation2018, 231; Iannaccone, Citation1992; Kim, Citation2002, 186). Although the church nominally belongs to God, the founder is, in effect, the financial owner of the church (Chung, Citation2018, 231–232). Ministers may reveal the details of the churchgoers’ offerings but not their salaries or the church’s overall finances. The requirement for priests to pay tax was legislated in Korea in 2017 after a long delay but was not enforced. The Korean clergy were ‘tax-exempt’, but Catholic priests paid their income tax, responding to the public consciousness. Only a small number of Protestant ministers paid their taxes and declared their income until 2018. The churches spent the bare minimum on relief projects – e.g., less than 4 per cent in the early 1990s (Noh, Citation1994b, 124–128).
In the Korean economy, hereditary succession of leadership is expected, which is how the chaebols (the family-based conglomerates) pass their leadership and wealth to descendants – their sons and grandchildren (Yun, Citation2020). This is emulated in the Korean church. Mega-churches such as Yoido Full Gospel Church and Myungsung Church have established hospitals, schools, and evangelical channels (Chae, Citation2021, 78). The sluggish economy and tight labour market have encouraged the head ministers to offer their family members easy employment through hereditary succession (Yun, Citation2020, 470–471). This hereditary practice of passing social and material capital to one’s children has become the envy of the broader population (Kim, Citation2016, 105–106; Yun, Citation2020, 471–472).
The ministers’ struggle to control their finances is at the heart of the conflict within the churches, which has attracted ongoing public interest and criticism (Chung, Citation2018, 248). The economic perspectives reveal much about the structural properties of the church as a socioeconomic organisation. The church certainly incorporates economic properties in its operation, but it is expected not to operate solely as a profit-oriented organisation. Otherwise, it attracts public outrage (Iannaccone, Citation1992, 126).
Theological, economic, and social-scientific approaches tend to identify mammonism, material gain, and control as the causes of the heresy of simony. Key characteristics of the phenomenon of ‘power heredity in a church’ are as follows. A privileged few are involved in deciding the future head minister (Kim, Citation2017, 3), although it appears to follow a democratic process. Notably, influential churches have created and supported undemocratic networks to obtain power and authority. Disciplinary distinctions, in data analysis, are intended to offer analytical insight, but they are tightly intertwined and must be considered simultaneously. There are numerous studies in Korean about heredity, many of which are theologically informative and analytical. By combining the strengths of these approaches, we can suggest a comprehensive explanation from critical realist viewpoints, especially a morphogenetic approach, deploying the concepts of structure, culture, and agency, which enables an analysis of the church in the broader structure and culture, and within the church as an institution.
Theoretical Framework and Research Methods
The church’s intersections between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’
Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture (Citation1951) and Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach (Citation1995) are deployed for this article. As a theologian, Niebuhr incorporated socio-historical perspectives and typologically dealt with Christians’ (and the church’s) relationships to ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. Niebuhr (Citation1951, 122) defines ‘Christ’ as ‘that unique devotion to God and … that single-hearted trust in Him which can be symbolized by no other figure of speech so well as by the one which calls him Son of God’. The properties of ‘Christ’ as values are relatively intransitive and distinct from the surrounding ‘culture’, which refers to the ‘total process of human activity and that total result of such activity [including] language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization, inherited artifacts, technical process, and values’ (Niebuhr, Citation1951, 32; see also Wilson, Citation2017, 3). The values of both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are located historically in Christian life. They are both meaningfully situated within the socio-cultural realm of Christian lives.
Niebuhr’s five models are: Christ against culture; the Christ of culture; Christ above culture; Christ and culture in paradox; and Christ, the transformer of culture. The five types lie on a spectrum: one extreme at both ends and three types in the middle (Lee, Citation2019, 114). A common criticism of Niebuhr’s schema is that no individual Christian or church can fit neatly into any of the five models (Park, Citation1998, 96). Indeed, the churches have diverse functions and goals that they pursue, and they accordingly use the most appropriate approaches to achieve them. Thus, a church’s interactions with the prevailing culture may be imbued with characteristics of all the five models. In other words, Niebuhr’s schema provides researchers with a broader set of principles to analyse the churches’ activities, but the five types are not mutually exclusive (Niebuhr, Citation1951, 231; see also Lee, Citation2019, 106). In particular, there is much commonality between the third, fourth, and fifth models. To operationalise, the five models are grouped into three: Christ against culture, whereby the church is conflated with ‘Christ’; Christ of culture, whereby the church embraces ‘culture’; and Christ above culture, Christ and culture in paradox, and Christ, transformer of culture, in which the church strives to meet the requirements of both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’.
These typologies of the church’s relationship with ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’, as developed by Niebuhr and modified by many scholars (Bargár, Citation2014; Carson, Citation2012; Keller, Citation2012; Marsden, Citation1999; Spickard, Citation2012; Stassen, Citation2003), are broader principles that are valuable for examining the politics and identities of denominations and individual churches. These typologies provide the church with possible directions for the intersections between Christian teaching and the surrounding culture. Given the literature on Korean Christianity and Niebuhr’s typologies of the church’s interactions with ‘culture’, contemporary churches may not easily fit these typologies, but Niebuhr’s fundamental insights about the church’s interactions with ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are still pertinent. To operationalise Niebuhr’s insights, we adopt the following metaphorical framework.
The church is like an iron plate between a horseshoe magnet’s North and South poles, which resembles Niebuhr’s third, fourth, and fifth models of church and Christian lives. Suppose the iron plate is in a perfect equilibrium between the magnet’s North and South poles. In that case, the plate trembles amid these poles but is not pulled either way: it struggles to maintain a connection with the North pole without readily embracing the South. The North pole is a metaphor for ‘Christ’, and the South pole is one for ‘culture’, according to Niebuhr. The church’s properties can change depending upon what it is linked to and pursues. It is affected by the prevalent structural, cultural, and human properties of the broader society and the church. There is continuity between the magnet’s two poles, but they consist of completely different properties to which the church is exposed.
A danger of the iron plate’s conflating with either of the two poles is that the church would lose its capacity to mediate between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ and thus be unable to live a Christian life – i.e., translate Christ’s teaching through life in the world. For example, the church’s conflation with ‘culture’ would make it part of ‘culture’ (just as an iron plate attached to a magnet becomes a magnet itself), thus totally losing the properties of light and salt. On the other hand, a church’s conflation with ‘Christ’ – e.g., living in a monastery – may help it maintain the properties of light and salt within, but the church would not have access to the world, and it would lose the opportunity to provide the world with Christian services.
As noted earlier, the properties of the North and South poles are relatively fixed. The church’s properties determine its own identity, and its properties result from the dynamics of the emergent structural, cultural, and human properties. When the church is closely conflated with ‘culture’ and becomes integral to it, Christianity loses public credibility. Christians do not want the public to regard the church as a ‘decadent barber shop’, which appears at the outset to offer one thing and in fact offers another. It is easy to fall into the trap of trying to meet the dual requirements from ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’, but ultimately falling into double standards. This article shares Bonhoeffer’s theological concern that humans continue to erase God from their lives. Drawing on his concepts of Christian maturity and de-religionisation of Christianity, he argued that ‘It is not the religious act that makes the Christian, but a participation in the sufferings of God in the secular life’ (Bonhoeffer, Citation1999, 36, cited in Greggs, Citation2009, 304). Niebuhr’s concepts of ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are aligned with Bonhoeffer’s ‘religion’ and ‘secularity’ (Greggs, Citation2009, 306), which are incorporated into the data analysis for this article.
Another relevant work is Margaret Archer’s (Citation1995) morphogenetic perspective on structure, culture, and agency, the latter of which refers to individual members with momentum for (non)change. Morphogenesis (or morphostasis) is explained by examining the relationship between the intersection between structure and agency and that between culture and agency. Social scientists (e.g., Castells, Citation1997, 24) recognise religious persons’ struggle to handle the intersections between otherworldly and this-worldly values. Niebuhr’s models essentially explain how the church and Christians as agents actively or passively drive the existing or emergent structural and cultural properties in society. The article analyses the prevalent and influential structure and culture with reference to the church and Korean society. It also examines agency’s response to them. Structural factors external to the church include the sluggish economy and unequal or exploitative class structure; cultural factors include competition and a sense of deprivation. Structural factors internal to the church include the pariah capitalistic non-transparent economy and the head ministers’ tenure and religious authority. Cultural factors include Confucianism, respect for teachers, shamanistic spirituality, close human networks, undemocratic governance, and gender inequality.
Research methods
I searched for news reports about ‘church heredity’ (교회세습, kyohoe seseup) from KINDS (the Korea Integrated News Database System), over the period from 1 January 2000 to 15 February 2024. The aim was to cover the most recent news and track any contrasting features compared to pre-2000. Data included 72 news reports, whose titles contained the term hereditary succession (‘교회세습’), and 24 editorials (nine from KINDS and 15 from news outlets not covered by KINDS), from 2000 to 2024. Of the 72 news reports, 31 had been published since 2013. In total, the text amounts to 144 pages, single-spaced A4. Additionally, the morphogenetic perspective necessarily incorporates historical and relevant secondary data. Thus, the data for analysis in this article has been sourced not only from KINDS, but also from published literature and internet news. Also forming part of the data were interviews with six scholars, ministers, and news reporters concerned with heredity in Korean churches. Participants were provided with explanatory statements and informed consent was obtained prior to interviews (Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee Project: 37443).
The analysis seeks to understand why hereditary succession has been occurring and is problematic in Korean churches and what sustains the practice; identify social factors that shape decisions around hereditary succession; and ascertain the catalysts and obstacles for attempting heredity and identify the implications. It analyses data with reference to structure, culture, and agency, internal and external to the church. The analysis considers the church’s religious, ethical, and socio-cultural responsibilities (Niebuhr, Citation1951; Tillich, Citation1948; Citation1959; Citation1963; Troeltsch, Citation1960), which have been cited and reinterpreted in the Korean context (see e.g., Kang, Citation2012a; Citation2012b; Youn, Citation2005).
Data analysis is based on the principles of the grounded theory method: open, axial, and selective coding, using NVivo. Open coding involves analysing text to identify concepts, events, and incidents, and grouping them into categories. Axial coding connects major categories or subcategories by examining conditions, contexts, and consequences. Selective coding, finally, identifies a core category – in this case, responses to ‘church heredity’ – and integrates it with other categories (Strauss & Corbin, Citation1998). An important goal of the analysis is to unearth the broader structure and culture of Korean society, which then leads the research to look for how Korean churches have followed particular pathways. One consequence of the trajectory taken by the churches is hereditary succession.
The rest of the article discusses the church’s struggle to meet two-fold requirements and how it has fallen into the trap of double standards; the factors internal and external to the church that encourage heredity; and the church leaders’ reflections on heredity and the way forward.
Findings and Discussion
The Korean church’s individualistic pursuit of growth has been a non-negotiable goal, despite its awareness of and desire for the need to meet the requirements of both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ (see Figure 1). The clergy’s ethos to grow the church reflects the economic development of Korean society, which has been underpinned by rapid industrialisation and urbanisation since the 1960s. The supposedly affluent but neo-liberal Korean society since the 1990s has resulted in a significant number of hereditary successions and severe public condemnations of the church’s double standard. Within their congregations, head ministers’ religious authority is uncompromisingly powerful and enables them to determine the church’s directions on how to embrace its duties and opportunities between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. Heredity involves the use of head ministers’ religious authority, as well as networks within and outside the congregation, and the process is facilitated by Confucian cultural factors such as emphasis on strong father–son bonds, harmony, and respect for superiors on the basis of age or rank (Bhang & Kwak, Citation2019). Ministers’ actions are legitimised by their religious authority, and they achieve profane goals in the name of ‘Christ’. Moreover, the congregants are preoccupied with shamanistic Christianity and blessings, and are reluctant to question the clergy, who monopolise the pulpit and summon the congregants regularly. The church offers the minister optimum conditions to seek simony. The following two sections elaborate on these conditions.
Figure 1: A Magnetic Model of the Church’s Relationship with ‘Christ’ and ‘Culture’
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From double requirements to double standards
The Myungsung Presbyterian Church, which has attracted significant media coverage, is a representative case of heredity that allows us to answer the central research questions in conjunction with other empirical cases and related concepts. Rev Sam-Hwan Kim and his 20 followers founded the church in a rented space of 112 m2 in July 1980. Later that year, he held the first of several ‘special dawn prayer meetings’, in addition to the usual daily dawn prayer. This morning prayer cultivated the members who were most faithful and committed to the congregation and the head minister. By the end of 1981, the church had 513 registered members (and 1,400 adults and 650 children were attending by December 1984). In November 1982, the church purchased a piece of land (1,157 m2), on which it started a building project (2,073 m2) in July 1983. The church kept expanding by purchasing land and embarked on construction projects to support its national and international missiological work. Today, the church has 100,000 registered members, more than 100 pastors, and a host of massive buildings. Its website vividly shows how complex it is for the head minister to lead and manage the mega-congregation religiously and organisationally, a task that is no less demanding than that required for a conglomerate. Rev Kim has sustained the effort for more than 40 years. The church represents his life.
According to the interdenominational Movement in Solidarity against Church Leadership Heredity (Gyohoi Seseup Bandae-Undong Yeondae), in July 2013 Myungsung Church established a branch church (Saenorae Myungsung Church), headed by Rev Kim’s son, Rev Hana Kim, consisting of 600 congregants and six pastors, with a building of 4,298 m2. This branch church was set to pave the way for the appointment of a head minister from outside Myungsung. In November 2017, Rev Hana Kim became head minister of Myungsung, despite adamant protests before and after. On 7 August 2019, the General Assembly Tribunal of the Presbyterian Church of Korea ruled that the founding head minister’s invitation for Hana Kim to head Myungsung Church was valid, causing the students at the Presbyterian Theological University to boycott their classes in opposition. On 3 September, 900 pastors gathered to oppose the hereditary succession. On 11 September, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Korea pointed out the Tribunal’s incorrect interpretation of the Assembly’s constitution and replaced all 15 Tribunal members.
This case of Myungsung Church, other hereditary successions, and financial embezzlement have attracted extraordinary media attention, which reflects the eroding life opportunities and relative injustice in the broader society. In a wealthy but sluggish economy, most Koreans suffer chronic relative deprivation, resulting from high inequalities in incomes and assets. In light of this, Koreans are increasingly aware of ‘double standard’ behaviours and activities. Public concerns about such conduct have been much more pronounced since the 1990s than in the more economically vibrant 1970s and 1980s, when there were just three cases of heredity (Bae, Citation2013). That is when Myungsung Church was established and prospered.
Without Rev Kim’s sincere devotion to ‘Christ’ and extraordinary organisational efforts, the congregants would not have supported his work towards achieving what the church is today. However, when Rev Kim’s retirement approached, he wanted to see what he had built continue and keep it under his guidance (interview, Prof Chong Chae-Yong, 26 April 2023). One way to achieve this was to appoint his son to his position, which was enabled by the prevalent structure and culture within the church, which he had influenced and shaped over 40 years. This might have been the most challenging trial and temptation ever in his ministry work. Rev Kim’s leadership capacity to gain the trust of the congregants was a fundamental enabler of the church’s growth and the consequent heredity, but the public perceived this heredity negatively. Public expectations of religious organisations are such that Christian leaders and their organisations should not only meet the general requirements like other corporate leaders and organisations but also an inherently higher set of ethical requirements. Contrary to public expectations, those inheriting churches took what looked like appropriate steps for succession based on the candidates’ merits and democratic consensus within the congregation, which was undoubtedly the case with Myungsung Church (Cho, Citation2001). However, the church has failed to meet the requirements from the public perspective. Thus, the church has a set of required standards known to the public, but it acts much like the corporate sector, which lacks the values of ‘Christ’, and therefore looks like a ‘double standard’ to the public.
The Oxford Dictionary (Citation2022) defines a double standard as ‘a rule or principle which is unfairly applied in different ways to different people or groups’. The term ‘double standard’ can apply to a rule or principle unfairly applied to the advantage of oneself or one’s organisation (Rybacki, Citation2021). Jin-O Yi, the editor of Dongan Church’s weekly news, argues that heredity is evidence of corruption, and is concerned about how the public will perceive it within the church. Cognisant of indulgences in the medieval era and heredity in the Korean conglomerates, Yi argues that heredity in the church is an indulgence of the wrong kind and that the church ought to ‘take the role of a vaccine to heal the infected society’. Yi also argues that the Korean church suffers from growthism, disorganised seminary education, and denominational politics (cited in Yi, Citation2000). Indeed, heredity represents the complex problems of Korean Christianity. No social organisation, including the church, can operate in a socioeconomic vacuum, and many Korean churches have closely adopted secular business ethics. When the Korean economy was relatively poor, with only a few mega-churches, terms such as ‘church heredity’ or ‘privatisation of church property’ did not exist. The wealthier the church has become, the more wealth it has sought, leading to financial scandals and heredity. That is, the church has become enslaved by money and power, reflecting the experiences of Korean society. Some of the features of the Korean church are indirect consequences of the 1997 Asian economic crisis and the Korean economy’s neo-liberalisation following the structural adjustment programmes under the IMF. These features include the uneven distribution of wealth, a reduction of the middle class, concentration of finance and industrial resources in the conglomerates, the collapse of small-to-middle size industries, and a decrease in job security (M.-B. Kim, Citation2012, 54). In this context of neo-liberalism, instead of striving to set high ethical standards, the Korean church has become a reactive organisation that creates social concern. Taking advantage of their religious authority, the clergy have sought profane gains, demonstrating little trace of a balance between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. This has made the church an organisation with limited integrity, which is what the public has perceived.
Similar to the experience of early Christianity after its gained power and wealth, Korea’s affluent but insecure economic context has directly contributed to the church’s efforts to secure wealth, producing emergent cultural properties to facilitate heredity. Han Wan-Sang, a sociologist, points out that once a church gains many attendees, its primary cultural value is maintaining a large membership (Yi, Citation2003). Effective church maintenance becomes the church’s goal rather than what it is for. According to a Baptist News (Chimrye Shinmun) editorial entitled ‘Korean Churches Bruised by the World’, the Korean church has engaged in misconduct, such as hereditary succession and alleged tax evasion, and this misconduct has been exposed to the public (Chimrye Shinmun, Citation2013). The editorial publicly accuses a particular church’s justification of its recent heredity (‘carried out in the will and glory of God’) as constituting a double standard that degraded the invaluable gospel because of the supposedly sacred institution’s engaging in profane gains. As the title of the editorial metaphorically suggests, the churches are bruised. It is accurate to say that this bruise is not due to their combative approach to secular values but is rather self-inflicted.
The church’s double standards have been evident in the devalued Anti-Heredity Regulation, which is public knowledge but openly ignored. Exploiting the regulatory loopholes, the church has deployed irregular strategies such as ministers of churches of similar size ‘cross-appointing’ their sons to each other’s churches, ministers passing the headship to their grandsons, and young ministers founding churches and their fathers’ larger churches being consolidated into those of the sons (Kyunghyang Shinmun, Citation2015). Once a minister is determined to carry out heredity, based on his religious authority and influence within his own congregation and denomination, the Anti-Heredity Regulation cannot stop him from proceeding, despite the possibility of being defamed by both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. The hereditary fathers and sons generally seem to remain unrepentant, as Rev Chang-In Kim is the only one who has ever admitted to ‘a great mistake before the Korean Church and God’. Rev Kim repented that the heredity caused pain and wounds in the hearts of the church members, conflicts between the members and the clergy, physical attacks, and criminal proceedings (Kyunghyang Shinmun, Citation2015; KBS News, Citation2000). The media has pointed out that the church is not the clergy’s personal property but belongs to God, the church members, and the community, and that heredity is socially and religiously wrong (Hankook Ilbo, Citation2012). Past research also indicates that heredity results from extraordinary and unacceptable collusion between fathers and sons (Kwon, Citation2008, 261), helping to make Protestantism the least preferred religion in Korea.
Why has hereditary succession become prevalent and problematic since the 1990s? Why is the church choosing to pursue a double standard, like decadent barber shops or corrupt prosecutors? What are the emergent structural properties to trigger heredity? In brief, when the individuals are exclusively family-oriented in the context of severe competition underpinned by neo-liberalism since the 1990s with a sluggish economy and indigenised Confucianism, church ministers see the church as ‘private property’ that they can own and dispose of as they like, which involves not only church property but also the churchgoers (Kukmin Ilbo, Citation2013). Closely reflecting the structural and cultural properties of Korean society since the 1990s, the church has drifted to prioritise ‘their greed for money, honour, and power’ (Jo, Citation2019), resulting in the practice of heredity. Koreans do not blindly oppose inheritance of any kind, but they oppose it in some circumstances. The heredity of certain products’ craftsmanship is desirable and respected, but church pastorship is not one of these instances. The mega-churches and the churches in and around Seoul are more frequently involved in heredity and attract more public attention. According to the interdenominational Movement in Solidarity against Church Leadership Heredity, as of early August 2013, 143 churches had completed the heredity of head ministership. Eighty per cent of them (113 churches) were located in Seoul or the surrounding areas. No case was found in impoverished rural areas (Jo, Citation2019). Ministers of rural churches generally have paid employment separate from their ministries, and these churches see little value in heredity. Poverty and sacrifice are required in these areas, which has led some to argue that the heredity of rural churches should even be encouraged (Woo, Citation2000, 83).
Catalysts for hereditary succession: Money, honour, and power
What are the catalysts for the heredity of head ministership? All Korean churches are associated with their denominational associations, but their financial sustainability is based on the principle of survival of the fittest. The head minister is responsible for founding a church, its growth, and its long-term maintenance (Iannaccone, Citation1992). The church is a site of religious service and worship for the members and livelihood for the clergy. Unlike in Protestantism, Catholic churches are under centralised control; the priests regularly rotate their posts and have no offspring to inherit their positions. The Protestant clergy’s spiritual leadership is judged by the prosperity of their churches and financial achievements, which was the very foundation of the exponential growth of Protestantism after the end of the Korean War. In the near absence of central control but with excessive autonomy over individual institutions, head ministers enjoy absolute authority over finance, administration, and human resources (Yi, Citation2013), which says much about the Korean church’s organisational structure and culture, with the potential to enable the performance of heredity. Rev Professor Bae Dawkmahn (interview, 15 April 2023), a church historian, contends that heredity is a family’s attempt to perpetuate specific material or ecclesiastical privileges.
The well-educated Korean congregants could stand against hereditary succession if the church was a democratic environment. However, Rev In-Sung Pang points out the prevalent culture in Korean churches, which head ministers create and deploy to keep their congregants under tight control. According to Rev Pang, congregants are systematically indoctrinated to be subservient to the head minister (Yi, Citation2013). With the social status of a teacher, the Protestant clergy has exploited the indigenised culture of Confucianism and shamanism and the congregants’ desire for a sense of belonging in the rapidly changing Korean society and success in the competitive environment (Baker, Citation2008). Rev Pang calls this practice shamanistic Christianity and prosperity-offering, which blesses the members’ loyalty and punishes them for wrongdoing. Thus, the intellectuals, professionals, and successful businesspersons who once joined the church have all become unconditionally submissive to authoritarian head ministers. Some become elders and part of the decision-making bodies in the church, but they continue to support their ministers and desire their blessings rather than serving as independent members who make constructive decisions for the congregation. This differs from the rules of governing bodies such as synods and assemblies in the West. Congregational interests only prevail if they align with those of the head minister. Indeed, the close spiritual affinities between Korean shamanism, evangelicalism, fundamentalism, conservative Christianity, and Pentecostalism have significantly influenced the exponential growth of the Korean church but continue to characterise what most churches seek and how they relate to ‘culture’ (Cox, Citation1995; Kim, Citation2013, 8–11).
Consequently, churchgoers are not necessarily encouraged to be disciples of Jesus Christ, but rather of the head minister, and not the light and salt of the world, but within the church (Yi, Citation2013). This does not positively contribute to the surrounding ‘culture’ or transform it (Niebuhr, Citation1951). Head ministers deploy the emergent structural and cultural context as part of emergent personal capacity, strengthening their power and authority. In contemporary South Korea, chaebol inheritance is considered ethically inappropriate, but some Korean churches blatantly pursue heredity without considering the public. The mega-churches such as Choonghyun, Kwanglim, and Somang have many high-level and influential bureaucrats and professionals as members, but they have not prevented heredity (Hankyoreh, Citation2000). Respect for such secular value and success always accompanies the construction of massive buildings based on huge mortgages, which sometimes makes it difficult for capable candidates to become head ministers, so the sons tend to do so instead (interview, Rev In-Sung Pang, an adamant advocate for church reformation, 4 May 2023).
The larger the church, which is often led by a charismatic minister, the more likely hereditary succession will occur due to the large amount of money involved, as in Choonghyun, Seongmin, Seoul-Jungang Baptist, Somang, and Gangnam-Jungang Baptist Church (Munhwa Ilbo, Citation2000). The interdenominational Christian Ethics Practice Movement Headquarters (Gidokgyo Yulli Silcheon Undong Bonbu) suggests several reasons to oppose hereditary succession. First, Christian leadership is not based on lineage, and heredity is non-biblical. Second, the church is a place of worship, but the place is not a property to be inherited (Hankyoreh, Citation2000), but often the financial stakes are so high that it is challenging for head ministers to ignore the potential monetary gains. The ministers are unlikely to justify heredity in terms of their voracity for money, honour, and power. Instead, their typical responses are like those of Rev Hong-Do Kim of Kumnan Church: heredity occurs through appropriate procedures; the inheritors are well qualified; the mission, not its assets, is inherited; the head minister’s son is preferred for the church’s harmony; and jealousy by other potential candidates can be prevented (Na, Citation2012, 276). None of these justifications is credible in the eyes of the public. The rule of head ministers is strong and there is little to interfere with it. Peter Wagner (Citation1999) has argued that ministers should be allowed to choose their successors and possibly engage in heredity, thereby explicitly encouraging simony, and his views have been attractive to Korean ministers eager to grow their churches (Kwon, Citation2008, 260).
The powerful head ministers have little interest in genuinely democratic and organised succession plans for their positions. The timing of succession is not based on need but is geared towards the convenience of head ministers and their sons/successors. The church has diligently emulated many of the characteristics of the chaebol and sticks to long-held traditions that suit the ministers’ convenience. Head ministers employ their sons as associate pastors to build their experience before the succession; fathers support their sons financially to establish new churches or welfare institutes that family members will lead; and these churches and institutes later merge to form conglomerates. These practices convincingly inform the public of the church’s privatisation. In a case in Bucheon, the head minister of one church created the positions of the chairperson of the Church Council and head minister, which the father and son respectively filled. Upon the father’s retirement, the son took over as the chairperson. The head minister was the president of an influential Christian association and was widely supported; if the son was qualified, the head minister’s succession was left to individual churches (Hwang, Citation2012). The head minister’s unchecked power and authority were inevitable because he started the church, and his tenure was guaranteed until retirement. He was also the sole occupier of the pulpit at Sunday services (Jayuui Saenorae, Citation2020). Kwanglim Methodist Church’s Rev Sun-Do Kim carried out heredity in 2001, which encouraged others to follow suit. Kim’s two brothers, Rev Hong-Do Kim (Kumnan Methodist Church) and Rev Guk-Do Kim (Immanuel Methodist Church), also followed suit. Incheon Sungui Methodist Church passed its head ministership to a son in 1993 and then to a grandson in 2008 (Park, Citation2019). Bupyeong Methodist Church also achieved succession to the son and then grandson (Theos and Logos, Citation2015). Jeil-Seongdo Church passed it to the minister’s son-in-law (Y.-I. Kim, Citation2012). Seung-Yeong Hwang (Citation2012), editor of Hanguk Sungkyul Christian News, reports that the idea of heredity is prevalent in some clergies, who publicly say, ‘those who don’t do it are the fools’. Sang-Wook Byun (interview, 13 May 2023), a veteran reporter on the Korean church, says there is a remarkable similarity between conglomerates and mega-churches in how they operate and grow.
The high number of Methodist churches practising heredity stems from their Bishop/superintendent governance. Former Bishops retain influence, granting them unchecked power to enforce heredity. Mega-church ministers can financially support the denominational assembly and secure election as Bishops (Hwang, Citation2012). News reports, which often closely represent public opinion, reveal that the Korean church does not care for common sense and, thus, has lost the ability to self-correct. The influential ministers’ greed for money, honour, and power is an underlying element of the crises of the Korean church, including heredity. The ministers’ perceived core tasks are ‘Christ’-related, and they can legitimise their activities in these terms, but in reality, they heavily lean towards ‘culture’, which has been critically exposed to the public. According to Hwang (Citation2012), a retired head minister of a Gangnam mega-church whose property was worth more than $1 billion, it was almost wasteful for him to pass the church to his son as he had built it into an organisation with considerable money and power. For Hwang, the church must be his personal property. The ministers argue that they are devoted to the church as a unique organisation, but they do not resist the secular benefits that are derived from it.
Consequently, the church does not serve its religious and social duties (Kang, Citation2012a, 134; Niebuhr, Citation1941, 20). Once the church had paved the way for leadership heredity, which has attracted strong criticism, the emergent culture to embrace it also grew rapidly. A survey of Protestant church ministers revealed that a majority (65%) considered heredity acceptable, which seems very different from the public view. In the medieval era, one way to stop the priests’ hereditary acquisition of money, honour, and power was to prohibit their marriage. Korean clergy’s desire for money far outweighs the current movement to reform the church (Cho, Citation2001). The heredity of head ministers has now become part of the church’s established emergent structural and cultural properties.
Reflections and Concluding Remarks
This article has illustrated how and why the Korean church has struggled to fit Niebuhr’s five models of church–culture interaction. While the church might align with ‘the Christ of culture’, its ethical standards have merged with or fallen below societal norms, making it a public concern for decades. There is little effort to balance ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ (see Figure 1, the magnetic model), so differentiating Niebuhr’s third, fourth, and fifth models seems irrelevant to Korean Christianity. A crucial step forward is establishing a fair succession process for head ministers, possibly using professional services to find the best-qualified leaders (Kim & Yoo, Citation2020).
Korean Christianity has been in decline, with six major Protestant denominations losing 393,258 members between May 2020 and May 2021 (Kim, Citation2021). This decline is partly due to secularisation, as people grow closer to ‘culture’ and more detached from ‘Christ’ (Wilson, Citation2016, Ch. 3). Hereditary succession has discouraged church participation, leading some youth to leave (Yi, Citation2020, 11). Internal and external critiques highlight this issue. Han Wan-Sang has urged Christians to shift from ‘believing in Jesus to following Jesus’ (Yi, Citation2003). Kyeongin Ilbo’s 16 May 2012 editorial called for religious reform after monks were caught gambling (Kyeongin Ilbo, Citation2012). Buddhist leaders pledged financial transparency, addressing concerns about religious institutions’ lack of accountability. The editorial noted that religious groups avoid taxation despite benefitting from donations. It also observed that religion now concerns the world more than the world concerns religion. The church must resist materialism and embrace its role of improving the world by serving others (Chimrye Shinmun, Citation2013).
In August 2012, a group of middle-aged progressive pastors held the Future Pastors’ Forum. They cited five reasons to oppose hereditary succession and urged the church to distance itself from ‘culture’. First, prioritising blood ties over God’s will is wrong. Second, senior pastors should be chosen through honest evaluations. Third, it is unfair to other applicants. Fourth, heredity cannot be justified by the Old Testament priesthood. Fifth, giving a pastor’s children preferential treatment is unbiblical (E.-G. Kim, Citation2012). These concerns have grown amid fierce job competition. Many treat churches as personal property or income sources, ignoring the fact that they belong to God (Yi, Citation2019).
Amid secularisation, the clergy has ‘no part in the faster-moving intellectual debate’ (Wilson, Citation2016, 78). Yet, unlike in England, the Korean clergy maintains influence due to Confucianism and shamanistic traditions. The culture of seeking blessings in competitive Korean society reflects the church’s alignment with ‘culture’ over ‘Christ’. Confucian values elevate ministers, fostering blind respect and enabling them to become ‘religious dictators’. An oversupply of theology graduates worsens the church’s decline. The Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) produces 830 ministers annually, though only half secure jobs. Ministerial employment mimics Korea’s competitive job market, with big churches resembling corporate structures, where head ministers set their own salaries.
Korean Christianity has benefitted from the country’s ‘compressed modernity’ (Chang, Citation1999), providing refuge amid economic hardship. Churches have adopted industrial expansion strategies focused on quantitative growth, mirroring the chaebol. Church growth remains a top priority, with denominations promoting discipleship training, evangelism, and cell group movements. Hereditary succession also sustains the church’s status and power (Kim & Yoo, Citation2020, 823).
Since the 1990s, Korean society has experienced neoliberalism, materialism, and extreme competition. Meritocracy has transformed a community-oriented society into a highly competitive one. Ministers’ sons receive a top education, while most Koreans, facing limited opportunities, have become opportunistic. Instead of upholding justice and hope, the church has absorbed secular ‘culture’, prioritising growth, corporatisation, privatisation, gender inequality, and hereditary succession, thereby deepening public distrust. While many see ‘Korean churches without Christ’, some more low-profile churches still offer hope. John Hus (Citation1953, 273) argued that churchgoers alone can reform the church by withholding offerings from corrupt institutions (see also Seon, Citation1996, 73).
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the Deputy, Regional, and Copy Editors and reviewers for their critical and constructive feedback on earlier versions of the article.
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No potential conflicts of interest are reported by the author(s).
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Funding
This work was supported by the Fostering a New Wave of K-Academics Program of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the Korean Studies Promotion Service (KSPS) at the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2021-KDA-1250002).
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References
First, Bae’s (Citation2013, 85–86) historical viewpoints note that South Korea accomplished rapid industrialisation after its independence from Japanese imperialism, and the Protestant church pursued prosperity most effectively by utilising Korean-style pariah capitalism (cheonmin jabonjuui), combined with indigenous shamanism (Grayson, Citation1995; Kim, Citation2013, 8–13; Citation2006; cf. Cox, Citation1995, 221–226). Korea’s rapid economic growth enabled the emergence of numerous mega-churches, making quantitative growth the most desired ethos and a sign of success. Consequently, frugality and sacrifice as Christian values were considered unrealistic and contemptible; realistic logic, meritocracy, and selfish desire became the central ethos of the Christian ministry (Bae, Citation2013, 85–86).
According to Bae, the senior pastors pursuing heredity have been theologically and politically conservative – in modern Korea, represented by the Presbyterian Church of Korea (and especially its Tonghap, Hapdong, and Goshin denominations), the Baptist Church, and the Full Gospel Church. The conservatives are ahistorical, otherworldly-oriented, evangelical and politically far-right, indifferent to national politics, submissive to conservative government authorities, and pro-American (Ryu, Citation2004). The senior pastors have either founded their churches or served them for decades with absolute control; hereditary succession occurs predominantly in the capital and urban areas (Bae, Citation2013, 96–97).
There is a missing link between Korea’s economic growth and the emergence of the affluent and mega-churches, resulting from the churchgoers’ access to increasing disposable income and their desire to accumulate wealth, backed up by prosperity theology. It is worth establishing the links between emergent structural and cultural properties in Korean society and their intersections with high Christian and worldly values (Archer, Citation1995; Niebuhr, Citation1951).
Second, theology and ministerial reasons for leadership development and succession are essential to a healthy congregation’s ministry. Ministerial studies note the problems of father-to-son succession, such as nepotism, which prevents better qualified people from leading the church (Birmingham Bureau, Citation2011; Hartley, Citation2012, 17). While Confucianism is embedded in Korean life for the sake of collectivism, the desire for individualistic pursuit and life opportunities is strong enough to cause resentment of privileges not well grounded in merit. Others note that heredity helps to ensure the stability of leadership, and leadership succession with an appropriate qualification and process does not amount to the heresy of simony. It has been considered justifiable, as shown by some successful cases of heredity, and facilitated by the influential Confucian habitus (Chae, Citation2021, 77). Immediate queries against Confucian habitus and exclusive familism could imply that such self-serving application of Confucianism against other families can cause friction and destabilise religious organisations (Deuchler, Citation1992; Yun, Citation2020). The underlying reasons for seeking heredity may be more than ministerial harmony.
Third, the economic perspectives of the Korean churches focus on issues such as their corporatisation and privatisation: in this view, the ministry is a business, the church is an industry, a minister is a business person, the churchgoer is a customer, the gospel is a product, worship service is a performance, and offering is a payment of the price of the product (Chung, Citation2018, 231; Iannaccone, Citation1992; Kim, Citation2002, 186). Although the church nominally belongs to God, the founder is, in effect, the financial owner of the church (Chung, Citation2018, 231–232). Ministers may reveal the details of the churchgoers’ offerings but not their salaries or the church’s overall finances. The requirement for priests to pay tax was legislated in Korea in 2017 after a long delay but was not enforced. The Korean clergy were ‘tax-exempt’, but Catholic priests paid their income tax, responding to the public consciousness. Only a small number of Protestant ministers paid their taxes and declared their income until 2018. The churches spent the bare minimum on relief projects – e.g., less than 4 per cent in the early 1990s (Noh, Citation1994b, 124–128).
In the Korean economy, hereditary succession of leadership is expected, which is how the chaebols (the family-based conglomerates) pass their leadership and wealth to descendants – their sons and grandchildren (Yun, Citation2020). This is emulated in the Korean church. Mega-churches such as Yoido Full Gospel Church and Myungsung Church have established hospitals, schools, and evangelical channels (Chae, Citation2021, 78). The sluggish economy and tight labour market have encouraged the head ministers to offer their family members easy employment through hereditary succession (Yun, Citation2020, 470–471). This hereditary practice of passing social and material capital to one’s children has become the envy of the broader population (Kim, Citation2016, 105–106; Yun, Citation2020, 471–472).
The ministers’ struggle to control their finances is at the heart of the conflict within the churches, which has attracted ongoing public interest and criticism (Chung, Citation2018, 248). The economic perspectives reveal much about the structural properties of the church as a socioeconomic organisation. The church certainly incorporates economic properties in its operation, but it is expected not to operate solely as a profit-oriented organisation. Otherwise, it attracts public outrage (Iannaccone, Citation1992, 126).
Theological, economic, and social-scientific approaches tend to identify mammonism, material gain, and control as the causes of the heresy of simony. Key characteristics of the phenomenon of ‘power heredity in a church’ are as follows. A privileged few are involved in deciding the future head minister (Kim, Citation2017, 3), although it appears to follow a democratic process. Notably, influential churches have created and supported undemocratic networks to obtain power and authority. Disciplinary distinctions, in data analysis, are intended to offer analytical insight, but they are tightly intertwined and must be considered simultaneously. There are numerous studies in Korean about heredity, many of which are theologically informative and analytical. By combining the strengths of these approaches, we can suggest a comprehensive explanation from critical realist viewpoints, especially a morphogenetic approach, deploying the concepts of structure, culture, and agency, which enables an analysis of the church in the broader structure and culture, and within the church as an institution.
Theoretical Framework and Research Methods
The church’s intersections between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’
Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture (Citation1951) and Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach (Citation1995) are deployed for this article. As a theologian, Niebuhr incorporated socio-historical perspectives and typologically dealt with Christians’ (and the church’s) relationships to ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. Niebuhr (Citation1951, 122) defines ‘Christ’ as ‘that unique devotion to God and … that single-hearted trust in Him which can be symbolized by no other figure of speech so well as by the one which calls him Son of God’. The properties of ‘Christ’ as values are relatively intransitive and distinct from the surrounding ‘culture’, which refers to the ‘total process of human activity and that total result of such activity [including] language, habits, ideas, beliefs, customs, social organization, inherited artifacts, technical process, and values’ (Niebuhr, Citation1951, 32; see also Wilson, Citation2017, 3). The values of both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are located historically in Christian life. They are both meaningfully situated within the socio-cultural realm of Christian lives.
Niebuhr’s five models are: Christ against culture; the Christ of culture; Christ above culture; Christ and culture in paradox; and Christ, the transformer of culture. The five types lie on a spectrum: one extreme at both ends and three types in the middle (Lee, Citation2019, 114). A common criticism of Niebuhr’s schema is that no individual Christian or church can fit neatly into any of the five models (Park, Citation1998, 96). Indeed, the churches have diverse functions and goals that they pursue, and they accordingly use the most appropriate approaches to achieve them. Thus, a church’s interactions with the prevailing culture may be imbued with characteristics of all the five models. In other words, Niebuhr’s schema provides researchers with a broader set of principles to analyse the churches’ activities, but the five types are not mutually exclusive (Niebuhr, Citation1951, 231; see also Lee, Citation2019, 106). In particular, there is much commonality between the third, fourth, and fifth models. To operationalise, the five models are grouped into three: Christ against culture, whereby the church is conflated with ‘Christ’; Christ of culture, whereby the church embraces ‘culture’; and Christ above culture, Christ and culture in paradox, and Christ, transformer of culture, in which the church strives to meet the requirements of both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’.
These typologies of the church’s relationship with ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’, as developed by Niebuhr and modified by many scholars (Bargár, Citation2014; Carson, Citation2012; Keller, Citation2012; Marsden, Citation1999; Spickard, Citation2012; Stassen, Citation2003), are broader principles that are valuable for examining the politics and identities of denominations and individual churches. These typologies provide the church with possible directions for the intersections between Christian teaching and the surrounding culture. Given the literature on Korean Christianity and Niebuhr’s typologies of the church’s interactions with ‘culture’, contemporary churches may not easily fit these typologies, but Niebuhr’s fundamental insights about the church’s interactions with ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are still pertinent. To operationalise Niebuhr’s insights, we adopt the following metaphorical framework.
The church is like an iron plate between a horseshoe magnet’s North and South poles, which resembles Niebuhr’s third, fourth, and fifth models of church and Christian lives. Suppose the iron plate is in a perfect equilibrium between the magnet’s North and South poles. In that case, the plate trembles amid these poles but is not pulled either way: it struggles to maintain a connection with the North pole without readily embracing the South. The North pole is a metaphor for ‘Christ’, and the South pole is one for ‘culture’, according to Niebuhr. The church’s properties can change depending upon what it is linked to and pursues. It is affected by the prevalent structural, cultural, and human properties of the broader society and the church. There is continuity between the magnet’s two poles, but they consist of completely different properties to which the church is exposed.
A danger of the iron plate’s conflating with either of the two poles is that the church would lose its capacity to mediate between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ and thus be unable to live a Christian life – i.e., translate Christ’s teaching through life in the world. For example, the church’s conflation with ‘culture’ would make it part of ‘culture’ (just as an iron plate attached to a magnet becomes a magnet itself), thus totally losing the properties of light and salt. On the other hand, a church’s conflation with ‘Christ’ – e.g., living in a monastery – may help it maintain the properties of light and salt within, but the church would not have access to the world, and it would lose the opportunity to provide the world with Christian services.
As noted earlier, the properties of the North and South poles are relatively fixed. The church’s properties determine its own identity, and its properties result from the dynamics of the emergent structural, cultural, and human properties. When the church is closely conflated with ‘culture’ and becomes integral to it, Christianity loses public credibility. Christians do not want the public to regard the church as a ‘decadent barber shop’, which appears at the outset to offer one thing and in fact offers another. It is easy to fall into the trap of trying to meet the dual requirements from ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’, but ultimately falling into double standards. This article shares Bonhoeffer’s theological concern that humans continue to erase God from their lives. Drawing on his concepts of Christian maturity and de-religionisation of Christianity, he argued that ‘It is not the religious act that makes the Christian, but a participation in the sufferings of God in the secular life’ (Bonhoeffer, Citation1999, 36, cited in Greggs, Citation2009, 304). Niebuhr’s concepts of ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are aligned with Bonhoeffer’s ‘religion’ and ‘secularity’ (Greggs, Citation2009, 306), which are incorporated into the data analysis for this article.
Another relevant work is Margaret Archer’s (Citation1995) morphogenetic perspective on structure, culture, and agency, the latter of which refers to individual members with momentum for (non)change. Morphogenesis (or morphostasis) is explained by examining the relationship between the intersection between structure and agency and that between culture and agency. Social scientists (e.g., Castells, Citation1997, 24) recognise religious persons’ struggle to handle the intersections between otherworldly and this-worldly values. Niebuhr’s models essentially explain how the church and Christians as agents actively or passively drive the existing or emergent structural and cultural properties in society. The article analyses the prevalent and influential structure and culture with reference to the church and Korean society. It also examines agency’s response to them. Structural factors external to the church include the sluggish economy and unequal or exploitative class structure; cultural factors include competition and a sense of deprivation. Structural factors internal to the church include the pariah capitalistic non-transparent economy and the head ministers’ tenure and religious authority. Cultural factors include Confucianism, respect for teachers, shamanistic spirituality, close human networks, undemocratic governance, and gender inequality.
Research methods
I searched for news reports about ‘church heredity’ (교회세습, kyohoe seseup) from KINDS (the Korea Integrated News Database System), over the period from 1 January 2000 to 15 February 2024. The aim was to cover the most recent news and track any contrasting features compared to pre-2000. Data included 72 news reports, whose titles contained the term hereditary succession (‘교회세습’), and 24 editorials (nine from KINDS and 15 from news outlets not covered by KINDS), from 2000 to 2024. Of the 72 news reports, 31 had been published since 2013. In total, the text amounts to 144 pages, single-spaced A4. Additionally, the morphogenetic perspective necessarily incorporates historical and relevant secondary data. Thus, the data for analysis in this article has been sourced not only from KINDS, but also from published literature and internet news. Also forming part of the data were interviews with six scholars, ministers, and news reporters concerned with heredity in Korean churches. Participants were provided with explanatory statements and informed consent was obtained prior to interviews (Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee Project: 37443).
The analysis seeks to understand why hereditary succession has been occurring and is problematic in Korean churches and what sustains the practice; identify social factors that shape decisions around hereditary succession; and ascertain the catalysts and obstacles for attempting heredity and identify the implications. It analyses data with reference to structure, culture, and agency, internal and external to the church. The analysis considers the church’s religious, ethical, and socio-cultural responsibilities (Niebuhr, Citation1951; Tillich, Citation1948; Citation1959; Citation1963; Troeltsch, Citation1960), which have been cited and reinterpreted in the Korean context (see e.g., Kang, Citation2012a; Citation2012b; Youn, Citation2005).
Data analysis is based on the principles of the grounded theory method: open, axial, and selective coding, using NVivo. Open coding involves analysing text to identify concepts, events, and incidents, and grouping them into categories. Axial coding connects major categories or subcategories by examining conditions, contexts, and consequences. Selective coding, finally, identifies a core category – in this case, responses to ‘church heredity’ – and integrates it with other categories (Strauss & Corbin, Citation1998). An important goal of the analysis is to unearth the broader structure and culture of Korean society, which then leads the research to look for how Korean churches have followed particular pathways. One consequence of the trajectory taken by the churches is hereditary succession.
The rest of the article discusses the church’s struggle to meet two-fold requirements and how it has fallen into the trap of double standards; the factors internal and external to the church that encourage heredity; and the church leaders’ reflections on heredity and the way forward.
Findings and Discussion
The Korean church’s individualistic pursuit of growth has been a non-negotiable goal, despite its awareness of and desire for the need to meet the requirements of both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ (see Figure 1). The clergy’s ethos to grow the church reflects the economic development of Korean society, which has been underpinned by rapid industrialisation and urbanisation since the 1960s. The supposedly affluent but neo-liberal Korean society since the 1990s has resulted in a significant number of hereditary successions and severe public condemnations of the church’s double standard. Within their congregations, head ministers’ religious authority is uncompromisingly powerful and enables them to determine the church’s directions on how to embrace its duties and opportunities between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. Heredity involves the use of head ministers’ religious authority, as well as networks within and outside the congregation, and the process is facilitated by Confucian cultural factors such as emphasis on strong father–son bonds, harmony, and respect for superiors on the basis of age or rank (Bhang & Kwak, Citation2019). Ministers’ actions are legitimised by their religious authority, and they achieve profane goals in the name of ‘Christ’. Moreover, the congregants are preoccupied with shamanistic Christianity and blessings, and are reluctant to question the clergy, who monopolise the pulpit and summon the congregants regularly. The church offers the minister optimum conditions to seek simony. The following two sections elaborate on these conditions.
Figure 1: A Magnetic Model of the Church’s Relationship with ‘Christ’ and ‘Culture’
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From double requirements to double standards
The Myungsung Presbyterian Church, which has attracted significant media coverage, is a representative case of heredity that allows us to answer the central research questions in conjunction with other empirical cases and related concepts. Rev Sam-Hwan Kim and his 20 followers founded the church in a rented space of 112 m2 in July 1980. Later that year, he held the first of several ‘special dawn prayer meetings’, in addition to the usual daily dawn prayer. This morning prayer cultivated the members who were most faithful and committed to the congregation and the head minister. By the end of 1981, the church had 513 registered members (and 1,400 adults and 650 children were attending by December 1984). In November 1982, the church purchased a piece of land (1,157 m2), on which it started a building project (2,073 m2) in July 1983. The church kept expanding by purchasing land and embarked on construction projects to support its national and international missiological work. Today, the church has 100,000 registered members, more than 100 pastors, and a host of massive buildings. Its website vividly shows how complex it is for the head minister to lead and manage the mega-congregation religiously and organisationally, a task that is no less demanding than that required for a conglomerate. Rev Kim has sustained the effort for more than 40 years. The church represents his life.
According to the interdenominational Movement in Solidarity against Church Leadership Heredity (Gyohoi Seseup Bandae-Undong Yeondae), in July 2013 Myungsung Church established a branch church (Saenorae Myungsung Church), headed by Rev Kim’s son, Rev Hana Kim, consisting of 600 congregants and six pastors, with a building of 4,298 m2. This branch church was set to pave the way for the appointment of a head minister from outside Myungsung. In November 2017, Rev Hana Kim became head minister of Myungsung, despite adamant protests before and after. On 7 August 2019, the General Assembly Tribunal of the Presbyterian Church of Korea ruled that the founding head minister’s invitation for Hana Kim to head Myungsung Church was valid, causing the students at the Presbyterian Theological University to boycott their classes in opposition. On 3 September, 900 pastors gathered to oppose the hereditary succession. On 11 September, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Korea pointed out the Tribunal’s incorrect interpretation of the Assembly’s constitution and replaced all 15 Tribunal members.
This case of Myungsung Church, other hereditary successions, and financial embezzlement have attracted extraordinary media attention, which reflects the eroding life opportunities and relative injustice in the broader society. In a wealthy but sluggish economy, most Koreans suffer chronic relative deprivation, resulting from high inequalities in incomes and assets. In light of this, Koreans are increasingly aware of ‘double standard’ behaviours and activities. Public concerns about such conduct have been much more pronounced since the 1990s than in the more economically vibrant 1970s and 1980s, when there were just three cases of heredity (Bae, Citation2013). That is when Myungsung Church was established and prospered.
Without Rev Kim’s sincere devotion to ‘Christ’ and extraordinary organisational efforts, the congregants would not have supported his work towards achieving what the church is today. However, when Rev Kim’s retirement approached, he wanted to see what he had built continue and keep it under his guidance (interview, Prof Chong Chae-Yong, 26 April 2023). One way to achieve this was to appoint his son to his position, which was enabled by the prevalent structure and culture within the church, which he had influenced and shaped over 40 years. This might have been the most challenging trial and temptation ever in his ministry work. Rev Kim’s leadership capacity to gain the trust of the congregants was a fundamental enabler of the church’s growth and the consequent heredity, but the public perceived this heredity negatively. Public expectations of religious organisations are such that Christian leaders and their organisations should not only meet the general requirements like other corporate leaders and organisations but also an inherently higher set of ethical requirements. Contrary to public expectations, those inheriting churches took what looked like appropriate steps for succession based on the candidates’ merits and democratic consensus within the congregation, which was undoubtedly the case with Myungsung Church (Cho, Citation2001). However, the church has failed to meet the requirements from the public perspective. Thus, the church has a set of required standards known to the public, but it acts much like the corporate sector, which lacks the values of ‘Christ’, and therefore looks like a ‘double standard’ to the public.
The Oxford Dictionary (Citation2022) defines a double standard as ‘a rule or principle which is unfairly applied in different ways to different people or groups’. The term ‘double standard’ can apply to a rule or principle unfairly applied to the advantage of oneself or one’s organisation (Rybacki, Citation2021). Jin-O Yi, the editor of Dongan Church’s weekly news, argues that heredity is evidence of corruption, and is concerned about how the public will perceive it within the church. Cognisant of indulgences in the medieval era and heredity in the Korean conglomerates, Yi argues that heredity in the church is an indulgence of the wrong kind and that the church ought to ‘take the role of a vaccine to heal the infected society’. Yi also argues that the Korean church suffers from growthism, disorganised seminary education, and denominational politics (cited in Yi, Citation2000). Indeed, heredity represents the complex problems of Korean Christianity. No social organisation, including the church, can operate in a socioeconomic vacuum, and many Korean churches have closely adopted secular business ethics. When the Korean economy was relatively poor, with only a few mega-churches, terms such as ‘church heredity’ or ‘privatisation of church property’ did not exist. The wealthier the church has become, the more wealth it has sought, leading to financial scandals and heredity. That is, the church has become enslaved by money and power, reflecting the experiences of Korean society. Some of the features of the Korean church are indirect consequences of the 1997 Asian economic crisis and the Korean economy’s neo-liberalisation following the structural adjustment programmes under the IMF. These features include the uneven distribution of wealth, a reduction of the middle class, concentration of finance and industrial resources in the conglomerates, the collapse of small-to-middle size industries, and a decrease in job security (M.-B. Kim, Citation2012, 54). In this context of neo-liberalism, instead of striving to set high ethical standards, the Korean church has become a reactive organisation that creates social concern. Taking advantage of their religious authority, the clergy have sought profane gains, demonstrating little trace of a balance between ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. This has made the church an organisation with limited integrity, which is what the public has perceived.
Similar to the experience of early Christianity after its gained power and wealth, Korea’s affluent but insecure economic context has directly contributed to the church’s efforts to secure wealth, producing emergent cultural properties to facilitate heredity. Han Wan-Sang, a sociologist, points out that once a church gains many attendees, its primary cultural value is maintaining a large membership (Yi, Citation2003). Effective church maintenance becomes the church’s goal rather than what it is for. According to a Baptist News (Chimrye Shinmun) editorial entitled ‘Korean Churches Bruised by the World’, the Korean church has engaged in misconduct, such as hereditary succession and alleged tax evasion, and this misconduct has been exposed to the public (Chimrye Shinmun, Citation2013). The editorial publicly accuses a particular church’s justification of its recent heredity (‘carried out in the will and glory of God’) as constituting a double standard that degraded the invaluable gospel because of the supposedly sacred institution’s engaging in profane gains. As the title of the editorial metaphorically suggests, the churches are bruised. It is accurate to say that this bruise is not due to their combative approach to secular values but is rather self-inflicted.
The church’s double standards have been evident in the devalued Anti-Heredity Regulation, which is public knowledge but openly ignored. Exploiting the regulatory loopholes, the church has deployed irregular strategies such as ministers of churches of similar size ‘cross-appointing’ their sons to each other’s churches, ministers passing the headship to their grandsons, and young ministers founding churches and their fathers’ larger churches being consolidated into those of the sons (Kyunghyang Shinmun, Citation2015). Once a minister is determined to carry out heredity, based on his religious authority and influence within his own congregation and denomination, the Anti-Heredity Regulation cannot stop him from proceeding, despite the possibility of being defamed by both ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’. The hereditary fathers and sons generally seem to remain unrepentant, as Rev Chang-In Kim is the only one who has ever admitted to ‘a great mistake before the Korean Church and God’. Rev Kim repented that the heredity caused pain and wounds in the hearts of the church members, conflicts between the members and the clergy, physical attacks, and criminal proceedings (Kyunghyang Shinmun, Citation2015; KBS News, Citation2000). The media has pointed out that the church is not the clergy’s personal property but belongs to God, the church members, and the community, and that heredity is socially and religiously wrong (Hankook Ilbo, Citation2012). Past research also indicates that heredity results from extraordinary and unacceptable collusion between fathers and sons (Kwon, Citation2008, 261), helping to make Protestantism the least preferred religion in Korea.
Why has hereditary succession become prevalent and problematic since the 1990s? Why is the church choosing to pursue a double standard, like decadent barber shops or corrupt prosecutors? What are the emergent structural properties to trigger heredity? In brief, when the individuals are exclusively family-oriented in the context of severe competition underpinned by neo-liberalism since the 1990s with a sluggish economy and indigenised Confucianism, church ministers see the church as ‘private property’ that they can own and dispose of as they like, which involves not only church property but also the churchgoers (Kukmin Ilbo, Citation2013). Closely reflecting the structural and cultural properties of Korean society since the 1990s, the church has drifted to prioritise ‘their greed for money, honour, and power’ (Jo, Citation2019), resulting in the practice of heredity. Koreans do not blindly oppose inheritance of any kind, but they oppose it in some circumstances. The heredity of certain products’ craftsmanship is desirable and respected, but church pastorship is not one of these instances. The mega-churches and the churches in and around Seoul are more frequently involved in heredity and attract more public attention. According to the interdenominational Movement in Solidarity against Church Leadership Heredity, as of early August 2013, 143 churches had completed the heredity of head ministership. Eighty per cent of them (113 churches) were located in Seoul or the surrounding areas. No case was found in impoverished rural areas (Jo, Citation2019). Ministers of rural churches generally have paid employment separate from their ministries, and these churches see little value in heredity. Poverty and sacrifice are required in these areas, which has led some to argue that the heredity of rural churches should even be encouraged (Woo, Citation2000, 83).
Catalysts for hereditary succession: Money, honour, and power
What are the catalysts for the heredity of head ministership? All Korean churches are associated with their denominational associations, but their financial sustainability is based on the principle of survival of the fittest. The head minister is responsible for founding a church, its growth, and its long-term maintenance (Iannaccone, Citation1992). The church is a site of religious service and worship for the members and livelihood for the clergy. Unlike in Protestantism, Catholic churches are under centralised control; the priests regularly rotate their posts and have no offspring to inherit their positions. The Protestant clergy’s spiritual leadership is judged by the prosperity of their churches and financial achievements, which was the very foundation of the exponential growth of Protestantism after the end of the Korean War. In the near absence of central control but with excessive autonomy over individual institutions, head ministers enjoy absolute authority over finance, administration, and human resources (Yi, Citation2013), which says much about the Korean church’s organisational structure and culture, with the potential to enable the performance of heredity. Rev Professor Bae Dawkmahn (interview, 15 April 2023), a church historian, contends that heredity is a family’s attempt to perpetuate specific material or ecclesiastical privileges.
The well-educated Korean congregants could stand against hereditary succession if the church was a democratic environment. However, Rev In-Sung Pang points out the prevalent culture in Korean churches, which head ministers create and deploy to keep their congregants under tight control. According to Rev Pang, congregants are systematically indoctrinated to be subservient to the head minister (Yi, Citation2013). With the social status of a teacher, the Protestant clergy has exploited the indigenised culture of Confucianism and shamanism and the congregants’ desire for a sense of belonging in the rapidly changing Korean society and success in the competitive environment (Baker, Citation2008). Rev Pang calls this practice shamanistic Christianity and prosperity-offering, which blesses the members’ loyalty and punishes them for wrongdoing. Thus, the intellectuals, professionals, and successful businesspersons who once joined the church have all become unconditionally submissive to authoritarian head ministers. Some become elders and part of the decision-making bodies in the church, but they continue to support their ministers and desire their blessings rather than serving as independent members who make constructive decisions for the congregation. This differs from the rules of governing bodies such as synods and assemblies in the West. Congregational interests only prevail if they align with those of the head minister. Indeed, the close spiritual affinities between Korean shamanism, evangelicalism, fundamentalism, conservative Christianity, and Pentecostalism have significantly influenced the exponential growth of the Korean church but continue to characterise what most churches seek and how they relate to ‘culture’ (Cox, Citation1995; Kim, Citation2013, 8–11).
Consequently, churchgoers are not necessarily encouraged to be disciples of Jesus Christ, but rather of the head minister, and not the light and salt of the world, but within the church (Yi, Citation2013). This does not positively contribute to the surrounding ‘culture’ or transform it (Niebuhr, Citation1951). Head ministers deploy the emergent structural and cultural context as part of emergent personal capacity, strengthening their power and authority. In contemporary South Korea, chaebol inheritance is considered ethically inappropriate, but some Korean churches blatantly pursue heredity without considering the public. The mega-churches such as Choonghyun, Kwanglim, and Somang have many high-level and influential bureaucrats and professionals as members, but they have not prevented heredity (Hankyoreh, Citation2000). Respect for such secular value and success always accompanies the construction of massive buildings based on huge mortgages, which sometimes makes it difficult for capable candidates to become head ministers, so the sons tend to do so instead (interview, Rev In-Sung Pang, an adamant advocate for church reformation, 4 May 2023).
The larger the church, which is often led by a charismatic minister, the more likely hereditary succession will occur due to the large amount of money involved, as in Choonghyun, Seongmin, Seoul-Jungang Baptist, Somang, and Gangnam-Jungang Baptist Church (Munhwa Ilbo, Citation2000). The interdenominational Christian Ethics Practice Movement Headquarters (Gidokgyo Yulli Silcheon Undong Bonbu) suggests several reasons to oppose hereditary succession. First, Christian leadership is not based on lineage, and heredity is non-biblical. Second, the church is a place of worship, but the place is not a property to be inherited (Hankyoreh, Citation2000), but often the financial stakes are so high that it is challenging for head ministers to ignore the potential monetary gains. The ministers are unlikely to justify heredity in terms of their voracity for money, honour, and power. Instead, their typical responses are like those of Rev Hong-Do Kim of Kumnan Church: heredity occurs through appropriate procedures; the inheritors are well qualified; the mission, not its assets, is inherited; the head minister’s son is preferred for the church’s harmony; and jealousy by other potential candidates can be prevented (Na, Citation2012, 276). None of these justifications is credible in the eyes of the public. The rule of head ministers is strong and there is little to interfere with it. Peter Wagner (Citation1999) has argued that ministers should be allowed to choose their successors and possibly engage in heredity, thereby explicitly encouraging simony, and his views have been attractive to Korean ministers eager to grow their churches (Kwon, Citation2008, 260).
The powerful head ministers have little interest in genuinely democratic and organised succession plans for their positions. The timing of succession is not based on need but is geared towards the convenience of head ministers and their sons/successors. The church has diligently emulated many of the characteristics of the chaebol and sticks to long-held traditions that suit the ministers’ convenience. Head ministers employ their sons as associate pastors to build their experience before the succession; fathers support their sons financially to establish new churches or welfare institutes that family members will lead; and these churches and institutes later merge to form conglomerates. These practices convincingly inform the public of the church’s privatisation. In a case in Bucheon, the head minister of one church created the positions of the chairperson of the Church Council and head minister, which the father and son respectively filled. Upon the father’s retirement, the son took over as the chairperson. The head minister was the president of an influential Christian association and was widely supported; if the son was qualified, the head minister’s succession was left to individual churches (Hwang, Citation2012). The head minister’s unchecked power and authority were inevitable because he started the church, and his tenure was guaranteed until retirement. He was also the sole occupier of the pulpit at Sunday services (Jayuui Saenorae, Citation2020). Kwanglim Methodist Church’s Rev Sun-Do Kim carried out heredity in 2001, which encouraged others to follow suit. Kim’s two brothers, Rev Hong-Do Kim (Kumnan Methodist Church) and Rev Guk-Do Kim (Immanuel Methodist Church), also followed suit. Incheon Sungui Methodist Church passed its head ministership to a son in 1993 and then to a grandson in 2008 (Park, Citation2019). Bupyeong Methodist Church also achieved succession to the son and then grandson (Theos and Logos, Citation2015). Jeil-Seongdo Church passed it to the minister’s son-in-law (Y.-I. Kim, Citation2012). Seung-Yeong Hwang (Citation2012), editor of Hanguk Sungkyul Christian News, reports that the idea of heredity is prevalent in some clergies, who publicly say, ‘those who don’t do it are the fools’. Sang-Wook Byun (interview, 13 May 2023), a veteran reporter on the Korean church, says there is a remarkable similarity between conglomerates and mega-churches in how they operate and grow.
The high number of Methodist churches practising heredity stems from their Bishop/superintendent governance. Former Bishops retain influence, granting them unchecked power to enforce heredity. Mega-church ministers can financially support the denominational assembly and secure election as Bishops (Hwang, Citation2012). News reports, which often closely represent public opinion, reveal that the Korean church does not care for common sense and, thus, has lost the ability to self-correct. The influential ministers’ greed for money, honour, and power is an underlying element of the crises of the Korean church, including heredity. The ministers’ perceived core tasks are ‘Christ’-related, and they can legitimise their activities in these terms, but in reality, they heavily lean towards ‘culture’, which has been critically exposed to the public. According to Hwang (Citation2012), a retired head minister of a Gangnam mega-church whose property was worth more than $1 billion, it was almost wasteful for him to pass the church to his son as he had built it into an organisation with considerable money and power. For Hwang, the church must be his personal property. The ministers argue that they are devoted to the church as a unique organisation, but they do not resist the secular benefits that are derived from it.
Consequently, the church does not serve its religious and social duties (Kang, Citation2012a, 134; Niebuhr, Citation1941, 20). Once the church had paved the way for leadership heredity, which has attracted strong criticism, the emergent culture to embrace it also grew rapidly. A survey of Protestant church ministers revealed that a majority (65%) considered heredity acceptable, which seems very different from the public view. In the medieval era, one way to stop the priests’ hereditary acquisition of money, honour, and power was to prohibit their marriage. Korean clergy’s desire for money far outweighs the current movement to reform the church (Cho, Citation2001). The heredity of head ministers has now become part of the church’s established emergent structural and cultural properties.
Reflections and Concluding Remarks
This article has illustrated how and why the Korean church has struggled to fit Niebuhr’s five models of church–culture interaction. While the church might align with ‘the Christ of culture’, its ethical standards have merged with or fallen below societal norms, making it a public concern for decades. There is little effort to balance ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ (see Figure 1, the magnetic model), so differentiating Niebuhr’s third, fourth, and fifth models seems irrelevant to Korean Christianity. A crucial step forward is establishing a fair succession process for head ministers, possibly using professional services to find the best-qualified leaders (Kim & Yoo, Citation2020).
Korean Christianity has been in decline, with six major Protestant denominations losing 393,258 members between May 2020 and May 2021 (Kim, Citation2021). This decline is partly due to secularisation, as people grow closer to ‘culture’ and more detached from ‘Christ’ (Wilson, Citation2016, Ch. 3). Hereditary succession has discouraged church participation, leading some youth to leave (Yi, Citation2020, 11). Internal and external critiques highlight this issue. Han Wan-Sang has urged Christians to shift from ‘believing in Jesus to following Jesus’ (Yi, Citation2003). Kyeongin Ilbo’s 16 May 2012 editorial called for religious reform after monks were caught gambling (Kyeongin Ilbo, Citation2012). Buddhist leaders pledged financial transparency, addressing concerns about religious institutions’ lack of accountability. The editorial noted that religious groups avoid taxation despite benefitting from donations. It also observed that religion now concerns the world more than the world concerns religion. The church must resist materialism and embrace its role of improving the world by serving others (Chimrye Shinmun, Citation2013).
In August 2012, a group of middle-aged progressive pastors held the Future Pastors’ Forum. They cited five reasons to oppose hereditary succession and urged the church to distance itself from ‘culture’. First, prioritising blood ties over God’s will is wrong. Second, senior pastors should be chosen through honest evaluations. Third, it is unfair to other applicants. Fourth, heredity cannot be justified by the Old Testament priesthood. Fifth, giving a pastor’s children preferential treatment is unbiblical (E.-G. Kim, Citation2012). These concerns have grown amid fierce job competition. Many treat churches as personal property or income sources, ignoring the fact that they belong to God (Yi, Citation2019).
Amid secularisation, the clergy has ‘no part in the faster-moving intellectual debate’ (Wilson, Citation2016, 78). Yet, unlike in England, the Korean clergy maintains influence due to Confucianism and shamanistic traditions. The culture of seeking blessings in competitive Korean society reflects the church’s alignment with ‘culture’ over ‘Christ’. Confucian values elevate ministers, fostering blind respect and enabling them to become ‘religious dictators’. An oversupply of theology graduates worsens the church’s decline. The Presbyterian Church of Korea (Tonghap) produces 830 ministers annually, though only half secure jobs. Ministerial employment mimics Korea’s competitive job market, with big churches resembling corporate structures, where head ministers set their own salaries.
Korean Christianity has benefitted from the country’s ‘compressed modernity’ (Chang, Citation1999), providing refuge amid economic hardship. Churches have adopted industrial expansion strategies focused on quantitative growth, mirroring the chaebol. Church growth remains a top priority, with denominations promoting discipleship training, evangelism, and cell group movements. Hereditary succession also sustains the church’s status and power (Kim & Yoo, Citation2020, 823).
Since the 1990s, Korean society has experienced neoliberalism, materialism, and extreme competition. Meritocracy has transformed a community-oriented society into a highly competitive one. Ministers’ sons receive a top education, while most Koreans, facing limited opportunities, have become opportunistic. Instead of upholding justice and hope, the church has absorbed secular ‘culture’, prioritising growth, corporatisation, privatisation, gender inequality, and hereditary succession, thereby deepening public distrust. While many see ‘Korean churches without Christ’, some more low-profile churches still offer hope. John Hus (Citation1953, 273) argued that churchgoers alone can reform the church by withholding offerings from corrupt institutions (see also Seon, Citation1996, 73).
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the Deputy, Regional, and Copy Editors and reviewers for their critical and constructive feedback on earlier versions of the article.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflicts of interest are reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Funding
This work was supported by the Fostering a New Wave of K-Academics Program of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the Korean Studies Promotion Service (KSPS) at the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2021-KDA-1250002).
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