I will summarise "The Avoidable War" by Kevin Rudd, chapter by chapter, then provide an objective review of the book.
### Chapter-by-Chapter Summary:
[cite_start]Kevin Rudd opens by reflecting on the devastating human cost of past global conflicts, particularly World War I and II, driven by flawed decisions and a failure to maintain peace while preserving freedoms[cite: 61, 62, 63, 64, 65]. [cite_start]He asserts that the 2020s represent a "decade of living dangerously" for the US-China relationship, where the stakes are unprecedentedly high[cite: 69, 70, 71]. [cite_start]Rudd emphasizes the need for "managed strategic competition" to prevent a catastrophic war, a concept he will elaborate on throughout the book[cite: 72]. [cite_start]He draws on his extensive experience as a student of China and a former Australian Prime Minister, highlighting his deep admiration for Chinese civilization and economic achievements, alongside his consistent criticism of human rights abuses, including the Tiananmen Square crackdown[cite: 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 84]. [cite_start]He acknowledges his Western background and Australia's alliance with the US, but stresses that this does not mandate automatic compliance with all US foreign policy[cite: 93, 95, 96]. [cite_start]Rudd concludes that nationalism is a dangerous force in international relations, and war between the US and China, while probable, is not inevitable, and leaders have the agency to avoid it[cite: 102, 270, 274, 276].
**A Short History of the US-China Relationship**
[cite_start]This chapter traces the complex and often distrustful history between the US and China, highlighting a recurring theme of mutual non-comprehension and suspicion[cite: 104, 106]. [cite_start]It notes that China has historically made understanding America a priority, viewing it as essential for survival, while American elites have rarely reciprocated this urgency[cite: 290, 291, 292, 293]. [cite_start]The chapter covers key historical periods, from China's self-contained past during the Qing dynasty to the Opium Wars, which forcibly opened China to Western trade and influence, including American commercial and missionary interests[cite: 298, 300, 312, 317, 318]. [cite_start]It discusses the disillusionment in China after World War I when the US failed to support China's territorial claims at Versailles, contributing to the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its eventual alignment with the Soviet Union[cite: 357, 358, 361, 362, 369, 384]. [cite_start]The chapter also details the acrimonious Cold War period, characterized by mutual demonization, the Korean War, and the subsequent strategic rapprochement initiated by Nixon and Kissinger due to Sino-Soviet tensions[cite: 419, 427, 431, 434, 435]. [cite_start]It emphasizes that while the US viewed engagement as transformational for China, Beijing always saw it as transactional, aimed at enhancing its national security and prosperity[cite: 464, 465].
**The Problem of Distrust**
[cite_start]Rudd delves into the deep-seated mutual distrust between Beijing and Washington, arguing that clear-minded strategic analysis requires understanding not just capabilities and intentions, but also perceptions[cite: 751, 752, 753, 921, 922]. [cite_start]From Beijing's perspective, American policy is seen as driven by self-interest and hypocrisy, particularly its claims of moral foreign policy while consistently seeking economic access and containing China's rise[cite: 757, 758, 760, 761, 763]. [cite_start]China views US support for human rights and democracy as an existential threat to the CCP's legitimacy, and sees American actions as attempts to instigate "color revolutions" within China[cite: 768, 777, 778]. [cite_start]The chapter highlights China's sensitivity to perceived Western racial and cultural condescension, drawing on historical grievances like the Opium Wars and the Chinese Exclusion Act[cite: 781, 783, 785]. [cite_start]From Washington's viewpoint, China is seen as deceptive and having betrayed the spirit of its WTO accession by engaging in unfair trade practices and militarizing the South China Sea after promising not to[cite: 876, 882, 884, 885]. [cite_start]This has led to a "downward spiral" of distrust and a hardening of American attitudes, contributing to the US-China trade war[cite: 881, 912]. [cite_start]Rudd stresses that mutual strategic literacy and clear communication, free of ideological bias, are crucial for managing this complex relationship[cite: 930, 934, 937].
**The First Circle: The Politics of Staying in Power**
[cite_start]This chapter asserts that Xi Jinping's paramount priority is ensuring the Communist Party's perpetual hold on power, with his own leadership solidified within that framework[cite: 1081, 1082]. [cite_start]Xi is deeply concerned by the Soviet Union's collapse and is determined to prevent a similar fate for the CCP[cite: 1084, 1085]. [cite_start]He has reversed previous trends of decentralizing party power, reasserting the party's central role in all policy-making, and zealously reintroducing Marxist-Leninist ideology across Chinese life[cite: 1101, 1103, 1110]. [cite_start]Alongside ideology, Chinese nationalism has become a key pillar of the party's legitimacy, with Xi fusing modern CCP imagery with ancient Chinese civilization, rehabilitating Confucianism as a symbol of benign hierarchical governance[cite: 1111, 1113, 1114, 1116]. [cite_start]Xi aims to surpass Deng Xiaoping and equal Mao Zedong in party history, enshrining "Xi Jinping Thought" in the constitution as the guiding ideology[cite: 1119, 1120, 1123]. [cite_start]He seeks to achieve the "China Dream" of a moderately prosperous society by 2021 and a fully advanced economy by 2049, aiming for "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation"[cite: 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129]. [cite_start]However, Rudd notes the tension between Xi's desire for party control and the need for market-based reforms to sustain economic growth, which is crucial for the party's social contract with the people[cite: 1134, 1135]. [cite_start]The chapter highlights Xi's crackdown on the private sector and the use of advanced surveillance technologies to maintain political control, reflecting deep anxiety about "color revolutions" and foreign influence[cite: 1140, 1147, 1149, 1161, 1177, 1198].
**The Second Circle: Securing National Unity**
[cite_start]Rudd highlights Taiwan as the most critical issue for the CCP's political priorities and its relationship with the United States[cite: 1206, 1207, 1208]. [cite_start]China views the US as the primary obstacle to its "sacred historical mission" of national unification, citing the Taiwan Relations Act and US military assistance to Taipei[cite: 1213, 1214, 1215, 1218]. [cite_start]The chapter discusses the shift in Taiwanese attitudes towards independence, particularly with the rise of the DPP, and how Beijing's gradualist approach to reunification has been undermined by events like the Hong Kong crackdown[cite: 1222, 1229, 1230, 1232, 1239]. [cite_start]Xi Jinping is presented as having concluded that gradualism has failed and is prepared to use all necessary means, including force, for reunification, accelerating military modernization with this aim[cite: 1235, 1236, 1240, 1242]. [cite_start]Rudd suggests Xi wants to achieve this within his political lifetime, possibly by the mid-2030s[cite: 1254, 1256]. [cite_start]Beyond Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia are also core national security interests[cite: 1259]. [cite_start]The chapter details the "harmonization" of Tibet, the imposition of Chinese language and culture in Inner Mongolia, and the severe repression in Xinjiang, including mass detentions and alleged population control measures, which the US has labeled as genocide[cite: 1261, 1267, 1268, 1285, 1286, 1287]. [cite_start]Xi's hard-line stance on these internal security issues, despite international condemnation, is attributed to his belief that national security imperatives outweigh foreign policy costs[cite: 1295, 1296, 1297].
**The Third Circle: Ensuring Economic Prosperity**
[cite_start]Economic prosperity is identified as Xi Jinping's third core priority, seen as fundamental to political stability and the CCP's legitimacy[cite: 1302, 1303, 1308]. [cite_start]Sustained annual growth of 5-6% is considered essential for employment, living standards, social welfare, military funding, and technological ambitions[cite: 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307]. [cite_start]Rudd outlines five major challenges for China's political economy: maintaining growth, balancing state and market control, reducing inequality, ensuring environmental sustainability, and managing US economic pressure[cite: 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320]. [cite_start]He describes three phases of Xi's economic strategy: the initial market-oriented "Decision" of 2013, the retrenchment following the 2015 financial crisis, and a third phase in late 2018 attempting to restore private sector confidence[cite: 1322, 1323, 1331, 1349, 1354]. [cite_start]The chapter introduces Xi's current "fourth phase," the "New Development Concept" (NDC), which prioritizes security, political stability, equality, and self-sufficiency over rapid wealth accumulation and open international exchange[cite: 1375, 1377, 1378, 1379]. [cite_start]The NDC's pillars are nationalist self-reliance (especially in technology), a dual-circulation economy (emphasizing domestic demand), and "common prosperity" (reducing income inequality through measures like forced philanthropy)[cite: 1411, 1412, 1418, 1427, 1445]. [cite_start]Rudd questions whether this top-down, state-centric approach will hinder long-term economic growth and private sector dynamism[cite: 1494, 1495, 1496]. [cite_start]The impact of US "decoupling" efforts in trade, investment, and technology is also discussed, driving China towards greater economic nationalism and self-reliance[cite: 1504, 1505].
**The Fourth Circle: Making Economic Development Environmentally Sustainable**
[cite_start]Rudd explains that environmental sustainability has become a critical priority for the CCP, moving up the political agenda due to public discontent over pollution and its impact on health[cite: 2602, 2603, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2609, 2610]. [cite_start]Xi Jinping has mandated that environmental protection is as important as economic growth for officials' performance reviews[cite: 2612, 2614]. [cite_start]The chapter notes China's significant role as the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter and its increasing carbon dioxide emissions, surpassing the developed world's combined emissions in 2019[cite: 2619, 2620]. [cite_start]While China made commitments in the 2015 Paris Agreement, its initial targets were easily met, and emissions rose during the Trump administration's withdrawal from the agreement[cite: 2640, 2646]. [cite_start]However, Rudd highlights a "significant change" in 2020 with Xi's pledge for China to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, a goal integrated into the fourteenth five-year plan[cite: 2650, 2651, 2652]. [cite_start]This pivot is attributed to a combination of domestic environmental consciousness, a desire for global leadership, alignment with China's industrial and technological goals (e.g., renewable energy), and a strategic move to preempt US pressure on climate[cite: 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2661]. [cite_start]The enormous investment required and China's continued reliance on coal power, including overseas coal projects, pose significant challenges to this pledge[cite: 2665, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2673, 2678]. [cite_start]Rudd concludes that climate policy will increasingly test China's credibility as a responsible global actor and is crucial for its "national future"[cite: 2691, 2692, 2693, 2695].
**The Fifth Circle: Modernizing the Military**
[cite_start]This chapter emphasizes that military strength is central to Xi Jinping's "China Dream" and his vision for the country's future power[cite: 2701, 2702]. [cite_start]Xi, drawing on lessons from China's "Century of Humiliation" and his own military background, is transforming the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from a largely land-based force into a high-tech military capable of projecting air and naval power globally[cite: 2703, 2704, 2715, 2716, 2717, 2718]. [cite_start]He has purged thousands of senior personnel to ensure absolute loyalty to the party and himself[cite: 2705, 2706]. [cite_start]The US now formally assesses the Chinese military as a "peer competitor" in East Asia[cite: 2707, 2708]. [cite_start]The core of China's military modernization is its focus on "informationized warfare," integrating digital data and intelligence, and a new emphasis on sea power over land power[cite: 2745, 2747, 2748, 2750, 2758]. [cite_start]This includes expanding its navy to achieve "open seas protection" and an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy against US forces in the Western Pacific[cite: 2761]. [cite_start]China is developing advanced aircraft carriers, submarines, and a new Rocket Force (PLARF) with a full array of conventional and nuclear missiles, including "carrier-killers" and "Guam-killers"[cite: 2764, 2784, 2785, 2786]. [cite_start]Rudd notes the significant increase in Chinese military presence around Taiwan and in the South China Sea, employing "gray-zone activities" to assert territorial claims without triggering full-scale conflict[cite: 2766, 2771]. [cite_start]Xi has accelerated the military modernization timeline to 2027, potentially aiming to secure Taiwan within his tenure[cite: 2791, 2792, 2793].
**The Sixth Circle: Managing China’s Neighborhood**
[cite_start]Rudd details China's sixth circle of interest: managing its fourteen neighboring states, a region historically vital for China's national security[cite: 3024, 3025, 3026]. [cite_start]China's approach, influenced by America's Monroe Doctrine, aims to reduce and eventually eliminate significant threats along its borders, including the US strategic presence[cite: 3035, 3036, 3041, 3045]. [cite_start]While maintaining military preparedness, China prioritizes political and economic diplomacy to foster compliant relationships, often employing "gray-zone pressure" rather than overt military conflict[cite: 3034, 3050, 3051]. [cite_start]The goal is to make neighbors economically dependent on China, rendering foreign policy objections futile[cite: 3053, 3054]. [cite_start]The chapter highlights Xi Jinping's strong commitment to improving relations with Russia, driven by shared concerns over liberal values and Western-backed "color revolutions," and by Russia's economic reliance on China due to Western sanctions[cite: 3056, 3057, 3058, 3060, 3076, 3078, 3079]. [cite_start]Russia is seen as a valuable strategic asset due to its willingness to act adventurously against the US and Europe, allowing China to project a more responsible image[cite: 3088, 3089, 3090]. [cite_start]In contrast, India has become increasingly problematic due to unresolved border disputes, China's alliance with Pakistan, and India's growing military ties with the US and Japan, leading to a "significant setback" for Xi's efforts to improve relations[cite: 3093, 3094, 3098, 3105, 3109, 3117].
**The Seventh Circle: Securing China’s Maritime Periphery—the Western Pacific, the Indo-Pacific, and the Quad**
[cite_start]This chapter focuses on China's historical vulnerability from the sea and its strategic objective to secure its maritime periphery by pushing US forces back to the Second Island Chain[cite: 4218, 4219, 4220, 4221, 4222]. [cite_start]China aims to fracture US alliances by combining military expansion with economic leverage against allies like Japan, Korea, and Australia, penalizing recalcitrant states and rewarding compliant ones[cite: 4232, 4236, 4237, 4238, 4240, 4241, 4242]. [cite_start]A critical development is the re-emergence of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between the US, Japan, India, and Australia, which Beijing initially dismissed but now views with growing concern as a significant regional response to its assertive posture[cite: 4245, 4248, 4249, 4290, 4291]. [cite_start]The 2020 border clash between China and India was a "catalytic event" that spurred India's deeper engagement with the Quad, leading to joint naval exercises[cite: 4284, 4285, 4286]. [cite_start]China's strategy to break the Quad apart, notably through economic retaliation against Australia ("kill one to warn two"), proved unsuccessful due to the lack of discipline of its "wolf warrior" diplomats and the Biden administration's focus on allied engagement[cite: 4304, 4305, 4311, 4331, 4333, 4334, 4336]. [cite_start]The first Quad leaders' summit in March 2021 solidified its purpose to "advance a free and open Indo-Pacific," alarming Beijing[cite: 4338, 4339, 4340, 4344]. [cite_start]China now sees the Quad as a potential "multilateral building block for a broader anti-China coalition"[cite: 4363].
**The Eighth Circle: Going West—the Belt and Road Initiative**
[cite_start]Beyond its immediate neighborhood, China's "eighth circle" of interest is projecting power westward through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aiming to enhance economic exchange with Europe and the Middle East, stabilize central and South Asia, and build new markets[cite: 4448, 4449, 4450, 4451, 4452, 4453]. [cite_start]Despite Western criticisms of debt traps and lack of transparency, the BRI has funded thousands of projects across a hundred countries, welcomed by many developing nations as their only source of infrastructure funding[cite: 4455, 4458, 4459, 4461]. [cite_start]The US's counter-initiative, Build Back Better World (B3W), is still in its early stages[cite: 4462, 4463, 4464, 4467]. [cite_start]In Central Asia, the BRI aims to minimize support for Uyghur separatism and is a source of energy and raw materials for China[cite: 4473, 4477, 4478, 4480]. [cite_start]China has skillfully navigated Russia's historical influence in the region, ensuring BRI projects do not disrupt the Eurasian Economic Union[cite: 4484, 4485, 4486]. [cite_start]In South Asia, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is pivotal to the BRI, but faces persistent security challenges from insurgents[cite: 4492, 4493, 4495, 4505, 4506]. [cite_start]The chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan created a strategic vacuum, and China, while wary, is stepping in to ensure stability and exploit mineral reserves, potentially extending CPEC[cite: 4514, 4519, 4520, 4521, 4531, 4534, 4536]. [cite_start]The Indian Ocean is crucial for China's energy security, leading to the development of "string of pearls" ports like Gwadar to project naval power along its sea lines of communication[cite: 4539, 4540, 4541, 4543, 4544, 4545].
**The Ninth Circle: Increasing Chinese Leverage Across Europe, Africa, and Latin America and Gaining an Arctic Foothold**
[cite_start]Rudd explores China's global ambitions beyond Asia, focusing on increasing its economic, foreign, and security influence in Europe, Africa, and Latin America, and gaining an Arctic foothold[cite: 4646, 4647, 4648, 4649, 4652]. [cite_start]Europe is seen as an economic opportunity and a means to fracture EU and NATO solidarity, especially on human rights, which Beijing views as a challenge to its legitimacy[cite: 4656, 4657, 4667, 4670, 4671, 4672, 4675]. [cite_start]China's economic ties with Europe are significant, but European concerns over market access and Chinese state-backed investments have grown, leading to stricter screening of Chinese FDI[cite: 4679, 4688, 4690, 4691, 4692]. [cite_start]The chapter highlights European backlash against Chinese sanctions and its "wolf warrior" diplomacy[cite: 4727, 4728, 4729, 4732]. [cite_start]In Africa, China is the largest trading partner and a significant investor, offering aid without political conditions, gaining reliable support in international forums[cite: 4771, 4776, 4777, 4786, 4791, 4792]. [cite_start]China is also expanding its security presence and arms sales in Africa[cite: 4795, 4796, 4802]. [cite_start]In Latin America, China has rapidly become the second-largest trading partner, investing heavily in infrastructure and energy, and actively isolating Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners[cite: 4850, 4851, 4862, 4863, 4866, 4871, 4874]. [cite_start]China's growing presence challenges the US's historical dominance in the Western Hemisphere[cite: 4848, 4849, 4913, 4914]. [cite_start]Finally, China is actively pursuing a role in the Arctic, driven by access to untapped energy and mineral reserves and the potential for a new, strategically secure shipping route to Europe via the "Arctic Silk Road"[cite: 4916, 4920, 4921, 4924, 4926, 4928].
**The Tenth Circle: Changing the Global Rules-Based Order**
[cite_start]Rudd asserts that China's ultimate ambition is to reshape the global rules-based order, which it views as a Western construct imposed by the victors of World War II[cite: 1807, 1808, 1809, 1820]. [cite_start]China desires an order that accommodates its national interests and values, rooted in a philosophical preference for order over chaos[cite: 1824, 1825, 1826]. [cite_start]Until 2014, China's approach to international institutions was largely defensive, but Xi Jinping's foreign affairs conference in November 2014 marked a "political watershed," launching a new era of proactive multilateral activism aimed at "shaping the future form of the international system"[cite: 1831, 1832, 1833, 1839, 1842, 1846]. [cite_start]Beijing has since rapidly expanded its influence within existing global governance institutions through increased funding and placing Chinese nationals in leadership roles[cite: 1864, 1865, 1866, 1867]. [cite_start]The Trump administration's withdrawal from multilateral bodies created a vacuum that China eagerly filled[cite: 1856, 1857, 1861, 1862]. [cite_start]Concurrently, China has built new institutions outside the traditional framework, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[cite: 1853, 1854]. [cite_start]A key arena of competition is determining future global technology standards, particularly in 5G, AI, and digital payment systems, where China aims to achieve dominance and promote its model of "cyber sovereignty"[cite: 1907, 1908, 1909, 1914, 1935, 1936, 1940, 1941, 1942]. [cite_start]China envisions a "multipolar world" and a "community of common destiny for all mankind," which, though vaguely defined, serves as an organizing principle for a more Sino-centric international system[cite: 1958, 1959, 1977, 1978].
**The Decade of Living Dangerously: Alternative Futures for US-China Relations**
[cite_start]Rudd outlines ten alternative scenarios for US-China relations through 2030, emphasizing the vast variables at play despite relatively clear fixed factors like China's military expansion and strategic competition[cite: 3338, 3339, 3340]. The scenarios are:
1. **China takes Taiwan by force; [cite_start]US does not intervene:** America's global standing collapses, seen as a "Munich moment." [cite: 3350, 3365, 3367]
2. [cite_start]**US defeats Chinese action against Taiwan:** A less likely outcome, but one that would lead to total loss of legitimacy for Xi or the CCP. [cite: 3374, 3376, 3380, 3381, 3389, 3390, 3391]
3. [cite_start]**China defeats US forces intervening in Taiwan:** An "American Waterloo," ending the American Century and shifting global power to Beijing. [cite: 3392, 3404, 3405, 3409, 3411]
4. [cite_start]**Military stalemate over Taiwan:** A protracted conflict without clear victory for either side, reminiscent of the Korean War. [cite: 3412, 3413, 3415]
5. [cite_start]**US and Taiwan deter China from using force:** Washington's "best-case scenario," requiring robust US and Taiwanese military and economic strength. [cite: 3423, 3424, 3425, 3426, 3427]
6. [cite_start]**Limited war in the South China Sea:** An unintended conflict from maritime collisions or attacks on non-US allied vessels, risking escalation due to integrated command structures and nationalist sentiment. [cite: 3433, 3434, 3435, 3436, 3437, 3438, 3439, 3440, 3443, 3444, 3456, 3457]
7. [cite_start]**Conflict with Japan and the US over East China Sea claims:** High risk of escalation due to US-Japan treaty obligations and historical Sino-Japanese animosity, which could devastate Asian economies. [cite: 3458, 3459, 3460, 3461, 3462, 3463, 3464, 3465, 3476]
8. [cite_start]**Conflict between China and US over North Korea:** Remote but possible, particularly if North Korea resumes nuclear testing, leading to US preemption and a potential second Korean War, with China intervening. [cite: 3477, 3478, 3479, 3480, 3482, 3487, 3490, 3492, 3498, 3499, 3500, 3504]
9. [cite_start]**Xi Jinping's regional and global strategy succeeds without military confrontation:** Xi's "optimal plan" of achieving preeminence through economic, technological, and diplomatic means. [cite: 3509, 3510, 3512, 3513]
10. [cite_start]**Xi Jinping fails to achieve his ambitions:** Marked by economic stagnation, social instability, and internal party factionalism, compounded by external pressure. [cite: 3552, 3554, 3555, 3556, 3557, 3560, 3561, 3562, 3563, 3566, 3568, 3571, 3572]
[cite_start]Rudd emphasizes that predicting the future is impossible, but if the US does not develop a sustained counter-strategy, the trend favors China's ambitions[cite: 3582, 3583, 3584]. [cite_start]He concludes that five of these scenarios involve major armed conflict, highlighting the profound and unpredictable consequences of war, and stressing the need for "managed strategic competition" to preserve peace[cite: 3592, 3593, 3596, 3597, 3598, 3599].
**Navigating an Uncertain Future: The Case for Managed Strategic Competition**
[cite_start]Rudd concludes by proposing "managed strategic competition" as a framework to prevent war between the US and China, emphasizing his deep respect for both nations despite their differences[cite: 3601, 3602, 3604, 3617, 3625]. [cite_start]He acknowledges the profound structural factors leading to a "clash of strategic perceptions" and the "death of strategic trust" between the two powers[cite: 3628, 3629, 3650]. [cite_start]From the American perspective, China under Xi is seen as a "self-selected collision course" with the US, aiming to alter the global status quo and expand its influence[cite: 3630, 3634, 3635, 3636, 3637, 3638, 3639]. [cite_start]Beijing, conversely, views its actions as natural self-defense and an effort to rewrite international rules, similar to what the US did post-WWII, believing "time and momentum are on Beijing’s side"[cite: 3641, 3642, 3643, 3644, 3645, 3647].
[cite_start]The proposed framework rests on three core propositions: mutual understanding of irreducible strategic redlines to prevent miscalculation; channeling rivalry into a competitive race in military, economic, and technological capabilities; and strategic cooperation in defined areas where interests align[cite: 3667, 3668, 3669, 3670, 3671, 3672, 3673, 3674]. [cite_start]Examples of redlines include abstaining from critical infrastructure cyberattacks and managing military deployments in contested maritime areas[cite: 3700, 3701, 3702, 3703, 3704, 3705, 3707]. [cite_start]Areas for cooperation include climate change, nuclear arms control, and global financial stability[cite: 3720, 3721, 3722, 3723]. [cite_start]Rudd argues that this framework, based on "verification" rather than trust, can significantly reduce the risk of war, buying time for political evolution and addressing global challenges[cite: 3676, 3677, 3678, 3850, 4117]. [cite_start]He contends that a decade of stability would allow the US to rebuild its economic and military power, and re-energize alliances[cite: 3842, 3843, 3844, 3943, 3944, 3945]. [cite_start]The book emphasizes the crucial need for US domestic economic reform and international economic re-engagement to counter China's gravitational pull[cite: 3951, 3960, 3963, 3968, 3973]. [cite_start]Ultimately, managed strategic competition is presented as the only viable alternative to "unmanaged competition" and the "growing risk of crisis, conflict, or war"[cite: 4073, 4074].
### Objective Review:
Kevin Rudd's "The Avoidable War" offers a comprehensive and deeply informed analysis of the escalating strategic competition between the United States and China. What sets this book apart from others on the subject is Rudd's unique perspective as a former head of government who is also a fluent Mandarin speaker and a long-time scholar of China. This dual insider-outsider vantage point allows him to delve into the nuances of both Chinese and American strategic thinking, presenting a more balanced and empathetic portrayal of each side's motivations than many contemporary works.
Compared to more hawkish books that emphasize an inevitable clash, Rudd's central thesis of "managed strategic competition" stands out. He rejects the fatalism of "Thucydides's Trap" as a predetermined outcome, arguing instead that agency and deliberate policy choices can steer the relationship away from conflict. While other authors might focus solely on military buildup or economic decoupling, Rudd systematically dissects ten concentric circles of Xi Jinping's worldview, from domestic political control to global ambitions, providing a layered understanding of China's strategic drivers. This granular approach, combined with his detailed historical overview of US-China relations, offers a richer context than books that might narrowly focus on recent events.
Furthermore, Rudd's willingness to critique both American and Chinese approaches, without resorting to partisan rhetoric, distinguishes his work. He does not shy away from highlighting US foreign policy missteps or China's human rights abuses, yet he consistently seeks common ground and practical solutions. His emphasis on the importance of "mutual strategic literacy" and "verification" over naive trust provides a pragmatic foundation for engagement that is often missing in other, more ideologically driven analyses. While some books may offer more detailed military assessments or economic forecasts, "The Avoidable War" excels in its synthesis of political, economic, and strategic dimensions, anchored by a compelling argument for a diplomatic framework to prevent catastrophic conflict.
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